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INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Michael C. Dorf*
Nearly every governmental action has the incidental effect of burdening some fundamental constitutionalright. In this Article, ProfessorDorf argues that constitutional text,
history, and structure, as well as normative considerations,require that courts treat these
burdens seriously. How, though, can government recognize these incidentalburdens without rendering itself powerless to achieve its legitimate ends?
Professor Dorf analyzes the Supreme Court's approach to incidental burdens on free
speech, free exercise of religion, and privacy rights. In these areas, he discerns a tendency to apply close scrutiny to incidental burdens that are "substantial." He then argues that the nature of the impinged right should also influence the Court's approach to
an incidental burden.
Finally, ProfessorDorf reexamines common understandings of the distinction between
direct and incidental burdens. He contends that his proposed framework ought to be
applied not only to incidental burdens, but also to direct burdens on conductfacilitating
the exercise of a fundamental right. Burdens on equality norms, however, need not be
substantial to elicit close scrutiny.

UNDAMENTAL constitutional rights1 are burdened in two principal ways. First, the government sometimes singles out protected
activity for disadvantageous treatment. For example, a state statute
3
might specifically prohibit flag-burning 2 or the use of contraceptives.
Second, the government sometimes enforces a law that does not, on its
face, regulate protected conduct, but that has the incidental effect of
burdening a right to engage in such conduct under some circumstances. For example, a state might apply its law prohibiting drug use
F

* Associate Professor, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful for the comments
and suggestions of Ashutosh Bhagwat, Vincent Blasi, Sherry Colb, Kent Greenawalt, Julie Hilden,
John Manning, Molly McUsic, Henry Monaghan, Gerald Neuman, Allan Stein, and Laurence
Tribe. I also benefited from my participation in the Internet discussion group Religionlaw and
wish to thank the other participants, especially Eugene Volokh, organizer of the list. I received
able research assistance from Lorenzo Bivans and Stacy Fols.
1 When I speak of rights in this Article, I generally mean rights to engage in primary conduct, such as speech, assembly, religion, abortion, and so forth. I have elsewhere contrasted rights
to engage in primary conduct with procedural rights, which can only be exercised in institutional
fora created by the government. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 265-66 (x994) (characterizing the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination and the right to vote in most government-run elections as procedural
rights). However, there exist rights that do not neatly fit into either category, such as the right to
own and possess private property and the right to equal protection of the laws. I briefly discuss
the proper treatment of rights such as these in section MlI.D.
2 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (x989) (invalidating a conviction for violation of
Texas's flag desecration statute).
3 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (invalidating a Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples).
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to Native4 Americans who ingest peyote as part of a religious
ceremony.
Let us call these two types of burdens direct and incidental, respectively.5 From the perspective of a rightholder, the severity of a
law's impact has no necessary connection to whether the law directly
or incidentally burdens the right's exercise. Direct burdens can be
trivial - for example, a one-penny tax on newspapers that publish
editorials critical of the government - whereas conversely, incidental
burdens can be extremely harsh - for example, applying a prohibition
6
against wearing headgear in the military to an Orthodox Jew.

Nevertheless, Supreme Court precedent sharply distinguishes between direct and incidental burdens.7 A law imposing a direct burden
will be permitted to override8 a fundamental right only if the law is

4

See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 89o (iggo) (finding no infringement of the

First Amendment's free exercise right when the state denied unemployment benefits to Native
American workers who were dismissed from their jobs because of their sacramental use of peyote,
on the ground that the state's generally applicable criminal narcotics law prohibited the use of
peyote).
S These two categories are closely related to the two "tracks" of free speech analysis identified by Laurence Tribe, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at
789-94 (2d ed. 1988), although the direct/incidental distinction applies to rights generally, not only
to First Amendment rights.
6 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. So3, 5og-io (I986) (upholding the application, of
military dress regulations to prohibit an Orthodox Jew from wearing his yarmulke indoors).
7 See infra Part II. Distinguishing between direct and incidental burdens can require careful
parsing of the acts permitted and torbidden. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2228-29 (1993) (examining coverage of and exceptions to a
collection of local ordinances proscribing ritual animal sacrifice and finding that, in the aggregate,
the ordinances impermissibly targeted the free exercise of religion by adherents of the Santeria
faith).
8 Rights theorists use a convention under which a right is infringed when the government
fails to perform its correlative duty, a right is violated when it is infringed without sufficient
justification, and a right is overridden when it is infringed justifiably. See Alan Gewirth, Are
There Any Absolute Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 91, 92 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984); see also
Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 425 n.38 (1993)
(adopting the infringement/violation convention).
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narrowly drawn to serve a compelling interest. 9 In contrast, laws im-

posing incidental burdens trigger more deferential judicial scrutiny.' 0
The doctrinal distinction between direct and incidental burdens
rests partly on a floodgates concern. Nearly every law will, in some

circumstances, impose an incidental burden on some right. In the free
speech context, for example, incidental burdens include: "environmental and minimum wage laws that raise the price of newspapers, thus
dampening public debate; laws that convert public parks to parking

lots, thus eliminating public forums; and laws that tax income, thus
reducing the amount of money individuals have to spend on expressive

activities.""

The obvious constitutionality of the government action in

these examples stands as a challenge to those who would construct a
doctrine that takes seriously the incidental burdens in the peyote case,
the yarmulke case, and other intuitively troubling cases. How can the
law control the floodgates and still capture our intuition that some incidental burdens pose severe constitutional problems?
Incidental burdens on free speech and religion have been the subject of numerous cases and academic analyses. Courts and commentators alike have analyzed incidental burdens on free speech as a species
of content-neutral regulation. 12 The Supreme Court's treatment of

"neutral" laws that burden religious practice 13 has undergone wither-

ing academic criticism 14 and was recently superseded by a federal statute.' 5 Less widely understood, however, are the common features
shared by incidental burdens on different rights. For illustrative pur-

poses, this Article examines the case law and academic literature concerning three important rights to engage in primary conduct: free
9 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (I988) (holding that content-based speech restrictions must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve
that end" (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 46o U.S. 37, 45 (983))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (977)
("[W]hen the government intrudes [on a fundamental right], this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by
the challenged regulation."). The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), stands as a potential exception to this general principle. It grants constitutional protection
to the decision whether to have an abortion but tests restrictions on the abortion right under an
"undue burden" standard that differs in significant ways from conventional strict scrutiny. See id.
at 878-79 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). In section II.C and Part fIIbelow,
I attempt to reconcile the approach of the three-Justice opinion in Casey with conventional strict
scrutiny, but for now, it will suffice to treat abortion as sui generis and focus on other fundamentalrights.
10 See infra Part II.
11Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHi. L. REV. 46, 1O5 (1987).
12 See, e.g., David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MAu L. REV.
492, 493 (988); Stone, supra note ii, at 105-14.
13 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-go (iggo).
14 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1ro9, 1111 (199o) (arguing that Smith is inconsistent with constitutional text, history, precedent, and theory).
isSee Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb (Supp. V 1993).
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speech, free exercise, and the right of privacy.' 6 The Article identifies
and defends a general approach to incidental burdens, and it concludes that laws having the incidental effect of substantially burdening
fundamental rights to engage in primary conduct should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss whether, in light of the risk of
subjecting numerous, otherwise valid exercises of government power to
searching judicial scrutiny, constitutional law ought to consider incidental burdens as posing any real problem at all. I argue that, despite
the strength of this concern, the best understanding of constitutional
text, history, structure, and purpose' 7 requires that incidental burdens
be treated as real infringements of rights.
The argument in Part I is both interpretive and normative. Initially, I contend that constitutional text, history, and structure point
toward -

but do not compel -

an interpretation that recognizes inci-

dental burdens as infringements on rights. Although a bill of rights is
logically consistent with protection against only direct burdens, I contend in Part I that the best understanding of the Constitution's juxtaposition of powers and rights affords protection against incidental
burdens as well. That juxtaposition suggests that the rights protected
by the Constitution are protected even when Congress (or, since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state) exercises a concededly legitimate power.
Normative considerations also support the inference that constitutional rights protect against incidental as well as direct burdens. The
two most common justifications for recognizing rights both lead to the
conclusion that incidental burdens should count as infringements of
rights. First, the nonconsequentialist treats the Constitution as protecting what are often called "rights as trumps."' 8 Under such a view, a
right blocks the pursuit of otherwise legitimate powers or interests, regardless whether the burden is direct or incidental. Second, a consequentialist justification for rights typically rests on the judgment that
some individual interests

-

designated as rights -

outweigh the com-

peting interests of the society as a whole. Because the strength of the
individual interest rarely depends on whether the government seeks to
override it directly or incidentally, the consequentialist decision to rec16 Most of the Supreme Court's discussion of incidental burdens occurs in free speech and
free exercise cases. I also focus on the right of privacy because Planned Parenthood v. Casey, os
U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.), suggests - perhaps
inadvertently - a useful approach to the general problem of incidental burdens.
17 Cf PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13

(iggi) (identifying histori-

cal, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential "modalities" of constitutional argument);

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, ioO
HARv. L. REv. 1x89, 18-o (1987) (discussing constitutional arguments based on text, framers'
intent, theory, precedent, and policy).
18 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 153, '53.
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ognize a primary conduct right generally ought to confer protection
against incidental as well as direct burdens. 19
Nevertheless, as I note at the end of Part I, recognizing that incidental burdens are real burdens does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that every incidental burden should trigger heightened
scrutiny. The remainder of the Article addresses the question of how
the law does, and how it should, protect rightholders against incidental
burdens and yet still avoid the floodgates problem.
In Part II, I describe and analyze existing doctrine with respect to
20
incidental burdens on free speech, free exercise, and privacy rights.
At least formally, the Supreme Court requires intermediate scrutiny of
laws that impose an incidental burden on free speech, although in
2
practice, the standard applied often appears to be quite deferential. '
As a matter of constitutional law, the Court has essentially abandoned
judicial review of neutral laws that burden the constitutional right to
free exercise of religion.22 Cases involving incidental burdens on
unenumerated rights do not tend to reach the courts with any regularity - perhaps because lawyers and primary actors have assumed that
the Court would not take seriously the claim that a generally applicable law might impose an impermissible incidental burden on such a
right. In short, due to its fear that taking incidental burdens seriously
would vastly expand judicial power to scrutinize legislation, the Court
for the most part treats incidental burdens as largely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes.
There are, however, exceptions. Although not entirely self-consciously, the Court has closely scrutinized incidental burdens that it
deems substantial. In the course of describing the current doctrine
governing incidental burdens in the free speech, free exercise, and
right to privacy contexts, I identify a substantiality threshold in each
of these areas.
19 One may therefore treat the Constitution as if it protects rights as trumps and still remain
agnostic about the question whether the Constitution really treats rights as trumps - a very
difficult question which is outside the scope of this Article. See James E. Fleming, We the Exceptional American People, ii CONST. COMMENTARY 355, 357 (1994) (arguing that the convincing
case for treating the Constitution as fundamentally democratic and secondarily rights-protective
has yet to be made).
20 As I have noted elsewhere, these categories comprise nearly all the rights to engage in
primary conduct that existing doctrine treats as fundamental. See Dorf, supra note x, at 269.
21 See Stone, supra note xi,

at 50-52 (observing that, despite the Supreme Court's use of

language suggesting heightened scrutiny of time, place, and manner restrictions and content-neutral restrictions on speech mixed with action, the Court often applies a deferential standard in
such cases).
22 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 89o (1990). Congress responded to Smith by
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb (Supp. V 1993)), which mandates that laws imposing incidental as well

as direct burdens on the free exercise of religion be subjected to strict scrutiny. See id. As I
argue below in section 1.B, the Act leaves open many difficult issues.
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Throughout Part II, I attempt to reconcile the constitutional theory
of Part I - which treats all incidental burdens as potential infringements - with existing doctrine - which only takes notice of substantial burdens. I conclude Part I by sketching a view of incidental
burdens implicit in the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.2 3 That opinion suggests - rightly in my view - that, in assessing the impact of an incidental burden on a right, the nature of the
right may matter as much as the nature of the burden. To use a free
speech example, whether a law forbidding sleeping in a park 24 places
a substantial burden on the right to express a view about homelessness
ultimately depends on the extent to which the right to free speech
guarantees the ability to make one's point in the particular way that
one deems most effective - and that is ultimately a question about
the scope of the free speech right.
Part It addresses several questions left unanswered by the doctrinal exegesis in Part II. It begins by challenging the conventional division of burdens into the two categories of direct and incidental.
Although constitutional law usually places a premium on the distinction between laws that single out protected conduct for regulation and
laws that do not, this distinction is incomplete. Within the category of
laws targeted at protected conduct, government sometimes acts with
the purpose of frustrating the exercise of a right. At other times, government merely addresses a problem associated with the exercise of a
right without taking a hostile stance toward the right. Many such
targeted regulations may facilitate the right's exercise, in the way that
a licensing scheme may facilitate the exercise of the marriage right or
the right to hold a parade. In general, laws having the purpose of
frustrating the exercise of a right pose greater dangers than either
facilitative targeted regulations or incidental burdens arising out of
neutral laws. Hence, I conclude that the substantiality threshold ought
to apply to incidental and facilitative direct burdens, but not to purposeful ones.
I also posit an important exception to this general proposition. Because some rights embody equality norms, the very act of singling out
persons who exercise such a right may constitute purposeful frustration of the right to equal treatment. The category of rights that embodies equality norms is quite broad and includes the general
guarantee of equal protection as well as some aspects of the free
speech principle (the government must be neutral with respect to competing viewpoints) and the free exercise principle (the government
must be neutral with respect to religion). Laws that violate such
23 50 U.S. 833 (1992).
24 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984) (holding that
the First Amendment does not protect participants in political protests from the enforcement of
generally applicable park service regulations against camping).
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equality norms ought to trigger heightened scrutiny, even if they only
impose minimal burdens.
Part III then discusses some implications and limitations of the
view advanced. It considers the relation between incidental burdens
and facial challenges. These two categories together account for most
of the cases in which a person may claim that the government has
violated her primary conduct rights, and in some sense, they mirror
one another: an incidental burden involves an assertedly unconstitutional application of an otherwise constitutional law, whereas a facial
challenge involves a purportedly unconstitutional law applied to one
whose conduct lacks constitutional protection. I argue that, despite
some superficial inconsistency, the proper approach to incidental burdens is consistent with the proper approach to facial challenges. Part
II next outlines some of the questions that will likely arise in determining what constitutes a substantial burden on a right, including the
question whether the distinction between positive and negative rights
pr~vides a principled basis for avoiding the floodgates problem. Finally, I suggest some implications of my approach for constitutional
rights other than the ones specifically addressed in Part II.
The main thesis of this Article is both descriptive and normative. I
contend throughout the Article that, to a large extent, existing law
treats substantial incidental burdens as problematic and largely ignores
other incidental burdens. I also argue that this is appropriate. Yet
there exists a significant gap between the law and the law as I argue
that it should be. The substantiality threshold is only implicit in the
law and is not uniformly followed. Courts will be better able to assess
the constitutionality of incidental burdens if they explicitly recognize
what makes such burdens problematic.
I.

WHY INCIDENTAL BURDENS MATTER

One could construct a model of fundamental rights that only protects rightholders against direct burdens. On this account, a right to x
is defined as a right not to be singled out for adverse government
action on the basis of x. Such a view is conceptually coherent and
would serve several practical purposes.
As the free speech examples quoted earlier indicate, 25 recognizing
incidental burdens as rights infringements could result in judicial scrutiny of all government regulation. Thus, some limiting principle is
necessary. Ignoring incidental burdens entirely provides such a principle and, because of its absolute character, avoids difficult line-drawing
problems.
Moreover, at least on average, direct burdens pose a greater danger
to individual rights than do incidental burdens. A law imposing a di25 See supra p. 1178.
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rect burden will often serve some interest in preventing people from
exercising their rights. Such an interest will ordinarily be illegitimate.
In contrast, a law imposing an incidental burden will ordinarily serve
independently important, rights-neutral government interests - the
very interests that the law advances in cases in which it does not infringe rights.2 6 In addition, within the category of laws imposing direct burdens, many laws will have the very purpose of frustrating (as
opposed to merely regulating) the exercise of a right. Such purposeful
burdens could be deemed worse than incidental burdens because the
illicit government purpose of infringing a right in some sense transforms the nature of the harm - in much the same way that a private
party's illicit motive may render some class of conduct more harmful
27
than it would be absent the illicit motive.
The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence provides a
helpful analogy. Only purposeful discriminationis proscribed; government action that merely has a disparate racial impact does not violate
the Clause. 28 Indeed, we can carry the analogy one step ftiher.
Equal protection law does not distinguish between laws that facially
employ a suspect classification for illicit or legitimate reasons; instead,
it subjects both categories to strict scrutiny. 29 The Court justifies parallel treatment of these categories partly on the ground that it is difficult to distinguish between permissible and impermissible motives in
the absence of strict scrutiny.30 Similarly, we might say that the difficulty of distinguishing between laws that purposefully frustrate rights
and laws that target rights for some other (benign) purpose justifies

26 See Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994) (making this point
with respect to free exercise of religion); cf. Stone, supra note ii, at 107 ("[O]ne might argue that
because laws that have only an incidental effect on free speech are not aimed at speech, but
restrict a broader class of activities, they are likely to rest on more substantial justifications than
do laws that expressly restrict communicative activities.").
27 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2196 (r993) (upholding sentence enhancement for battery based on racist motive). I have borrowed the notion that illicit purpose may
qualitatively change the nature of the harm from Sherry Colb's forthcoming article. See Sherry
F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1996); see also Laurence H. Thbe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public:
Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. I,
8 ("Properly drafted hate crime laws do not punish conduct because of what it expresses or
reveals about the defendant's belief system but because of the harms it causes.").
28 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976). As I argue below, however,
the Court's requirement of purposeful discrimination arises out of its understanding of the Equal
Protection Clause's substance rather than a more general view of incidental burdens. See infra
section flI.D.
29 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, u5 S. Ct. 2097, 2Ii2-13 (1995); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (i989) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion).
30 See Adarand, 115 S. Ct at 2112-13 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion)).
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treating all direct burdens as posing greater risks than do incidental
burdens. 3 1
Finally, one might note that direct regulation of rights represents a
kind of structural harm, in the same way that legislation inconsistent
with the principle of separation of powers or beyond the powers enumerated in Article I is harmful.3 2 These structural limitations serve
the ultimate purpose of preserving liberty;3 3 yet the Court views them
as important in themselves, often enforcing them even absent an obvious threat to liberty in a particular case.3 4 Similarly, a government
that punishes individuals because of their exercise of individual rights
quite apart from the harm it causes
is, in this sense, harmful in itself
35
to the aggrieved individuals.
At the very least, these arguments suggest that sound reasons can
be advanced for taking direct burdens more seriously than incidental
burdens. They do not show, however, that incidental burdens should
never count as constitutional infringements. In order to answer the
question whether the rights protected by the Constitution should receive any protection against incidental burdens, I now assess argutext, history, and structure, as well as
ments based on constitutional
36
normative considerations.

31 As I argue in section IfI.A, however, there remain good reasons to distinguish between laws
that, on their face, target rights, and laws that - whether or not they target rights - have the
purpose of infringing rights, just as one might make the judgment that there remain good reasons
to distinguish between broadly remedial uses of race and invidious uses of race.
32 See generally Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711-15 (1994) (using nineteenth-century constitutionalism as a model in which courts do not balance competing rights and interests but classify various

governmental purposes as legitimate or illegitimate).
33 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty . . ").
34 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, x'S S. CL. x624, 1626 (1994) (invalidating a federal law
prohibiting possession of a firearm in the vicinity of a school as beyond Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (invalidating the GrammRudman-Hollings Act's reporting provisions because they vested executive functions in a congressional official). But see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989) (upholding the United
States Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (x988) (upholding the
position of independent counsel).
35 The Court's equal protection jurisprudence has in recent years tended toward this conception. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 286 (1993), for example, the harm "is, quite literally, the
drawing of lines based on race." Dorf, supra note i, at 26o n.93 (discussing Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at
2824).

36 These sources are, of course, interconnected. See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1193 (arguing

that "the implicit norms of our constitutional practice call for a constitutional interpreter to assess
and reassess the arguments in the various categories in an effort to understand each of the relevant factors as prescribing the same result"). Moreover, doctrine also plays a significant role in
any constitutional discussion. Because of the complexity of the Supreme Court's doctrine, I defer
discussing it until Part II.
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Text

Upon first reading, the constitutional text appears to say nothing
about the question whether rights receive protection from incidental as
well as direct burdens. Of the express provisions of the Bill of Rights,
38
37
the text describes some in the language of a "right" or a "freedom,"
whereas others receive protection by prohibitory language applicable
to the government.3 9 On the assumption that the various formulations
may all be taken to protect rights, these observations only raise the
key question: are these rights against anything more than direct regulation? The word "right" does not compel an answer in either
direction.
Nonetheless, although the text is not dispositive, some readings are
more sensible than others. As Michael McConnell remarks with respect to the First Amendment's command that "Congress shall make
no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion, 40 the "more natu-

ral reading of the term 'prohibiting' is that it prevents the government
from making a religious practice illegal," rather than merely preventing "the deliberate targeting of the prohibited activity."4 1 Along similar lines, we might say that granting protection for a "right to do x" is

an odd way to protect a "right not to be targeted for doing x." Thus,
we can generalize McConnell's argument to apply to all primary conduct rights.
The strength of the textual argument may vary somewhat among
different rights. For example, the First Amendment prohibits Congress
from making any "law" establishing religion or abridging free exercise,

free speech, or free press. As I have noted elsewhere, one could read
this prohibition to direct our attention to the law rather than to the
37 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances'); id. amend. II ("right of the people to keep and bear
Arms"); id. amend. IV ("right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures"); id. amend. VI ("right [of the accused] to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel"); id. amend. VII ("tight of trial by jury"); id.
amend. IX ("enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people").
38 See id. amend. I (establishing "freedom of speech, or of the press" and "free exercise" of

religion).
39 See id. (preventing government from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion "or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press"); id. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to
be prescribed by law."); id. amend. V (requiring a grand jury and prohibiting double jeopardy;
compelled self-incrimination; deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process; and
takings of private property without just compensation); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting excessive
bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment).
40 Id. amend. I.
41 McConnell, supra note 14, at iiIS.
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conduct prohibited by a particular application. 42 One way to understand this command would be to discount incidental burdens, because
an incidental burden arises out of an application of the law rather
than out of the law itself.43 This argument suggests that the First
Amendment is unusual in not protecting conduct against incidental
burdens, because other provisions of the Bill of Rights do not focus on
the law in question. 44 This would be a remarkable conclusion to draw
from such slim textual evidence, however, especially in light of the
central place that First Amendment rights occupy in our constitutional
culture. 45 Thus, although one could logically reconcile a jurisprudence
that only recognizes direct burdens with the constitutional text, the
more natural reading countenances the recognition of incidental burdens as well.
B.

History and Structure

Turning from text to history and structure, we find that the manner in which the Bill of Rights became part of the Constitution sheds
light on the nature of the rights protected by the Constitution. The
Constitution proposed by the 1787 Convention and ratified by the
states contained no bill of rights. To be sure, it included a number of
limitations on the powers of the federal government, 46 but as the Federalists argued, the primary protection for individual rights was the
fact that the federal government could only exercise the enumerated

See Dorf, supra note I, at 248.
43 However, the fact that the First Amendment directs our attention to the challenged law in
any given case does not necessarily mean that, in determining whether the law is constitutional,
we should ignore its applications. See id. at 261-64 (discussing First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine).
44 McConnell argues that the First Amendment is a better candidate for recognizing incidental
burdens than are other constitutional provisions, because unlike the Fourth Amendment, which
only proscribes "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the First Amendment "is expressed in absolute terms." McConnell, supra note r4, at iri6. This argument appears to confuse the question
of how much protection a right receives against infringements - does the right prevent all interference or only unreasonable interference? - with the question of what counts as an
infringement.
42

45 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, I00 YALE L.J. 853, 884 n.192
(ggi) ("The First Amendment, more even than other constitutional provisions conferring fundamental rights, contributes vitally to the preservation of an open, democratic political regime, at
the same time as it secures rights of high importance to particular individuals.").
46 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9. Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton pointed to these

prohibitions to support the claim that the original Constitution did contain a kind of bill of rights,
See TiiE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6x). As
Anti-Federalists noted, however, the inclusion of some prohibitory language undermined the Federalists' claim that a bill of rights was unnecessary. See Brutus, Essay of November z,z787,
reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSrITUTION 313, 37 (Michael Kammen ed.,
1986).

I996]

INCIDENTAL BURDENS

1187

powers - 4 7none of which expressly authorized the violation of individual rights.
One of the chief criticisms of those who opposed ratification of the
original document was the absence of a bill of rights.48 "[I]n order to
gain acceptance of their handiwork, the Federalists had to commit
themselves, unofficially, to the formulation of a bill of rights when the
first Congress met in 1789, even though many Federalists felt that
such a list of protections was superfluous." 49 However, the fact that
the Constitution was ratified only with the understanding that a bill of
rights would be added 0 represented a resounding rejection of the Federalists' position. Among other things, the ratification deal signified a
See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. i7,1788), in THE ORIGINS
supra note 46, at 367, 369 (expressing Madison's view that
the omission of a Bill of Rights was unimportant because, among other things, "the rights in
question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted"); James Wilson,
Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 166, 167 (John P. Kaminski
& Richard Leffler eds., 1989) [hereinafter FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS] ("[Ilt would have
been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a federal body of our own creation, that we
should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested either by the intention or the act, that
has brought that body into existence.").
48 See, e.g., George Mason. Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention, reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 255, 255;
Letters from the FederalFarmer (II) (Oct. 9, 1787), reprintedin THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 270, 272; Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund
Randolph (Oct. i6, 1787), in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 47, at 152, 154.
For an instructive, if brief, account of the disagreement over the need for a bill of rights, see
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 536-43 (1969).
49 Michael Kammen, Introduction to THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra
note 46, at vii, xix. The Federalists initially opposed the inclusion of a bill of rights on other
grounds as well. They argued that inclusion of a bill of rights would be taken to imply the
existence of affirmative powers not otherwise delegated to the federal government. As Alexander
Hamilton put it, a bill of rights "would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were
granted." THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., i96i).
The Federalists also maintained that the enumeration of specific rights would give rise to an
inference that there were not other, unenumerated rights. See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving
the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. r, IO (i988) ("The Federalists disparaged the idea of
using a written declaration of rights in the Constitution precisely to protect the rights retained by
the people."). In addition, the Federalists opposed a bill of rights on the grounds of political
theory; to them. a bill of rights made sense only in the context of a compact between the sovereign and the people, but because the people were sovereign under the Constitution, a bill of rights
would be a non sequitur. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF
47

OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 282-83 (1988).
50 Massachusetts became the sixth state to ratify the Constitution

when the convention agreed
to a compromise proposed by John Hancock that involved ratification with recommendatory
amendments. See Michael A. Gillespie, Massachusetts: Creating Consensus, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION 138, 154-58 (Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). Roughly the
same compromise occurred in New Hampshire, the critical ninth state to ratify. See Jean Yarbrough, New Hampshire Puritanism and the Moral Foundationsof America, in RATIFYING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 235, 250-51. The expectation of amendments was thus in place when
Virginia and New York - two states without which the Union would not have been viable -
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prevailing belief that, absent a constitutional bill of rights, a govern-

ment with no express power to infringe rights could nonetheless do so
through the otherwise proper exercise of a rights-neutral power.

The Framers' generation understood this to be what the bill of
rights debate was about.-" The leading Anti-Federalists described a
bill of rights as setting "limits"5 2 or erecting "barriers"5 3 against government excesses. These metaphors are instructive. They suggest that

rights are walled-off enclaves into which the affirmative powers of
government would extend were it not for the protection of a bill of
rights. Importantly, the Federalists did not argue in response that
rights are not limits or barriers; they argued instead that the limited
grant of delegated powers would not create a risk of powers extending
into the protected zone of individual rights. They accepted that a bil
of rights, if one were to be added, would erect barriers to the exercise
of delegated powers - albeit unnecessary and dangerously suggestive
54
ones.
It should be understood that my historical/structural argument proceeds at a fairly high level of generality. Because of the inevitable

manipulability of historical description, any argument that a legal text
has a particular meaning as a consequence of certain historical events
should be met with skepticism.55 In my view, it would be nearly impossible to establish that the Constitution protects rights against incivoted on ratification. See John P. Kaminski, The Constitution Without a Bill of Rights, in THE

6, 33-39 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1992).
I do not mean to suggest that this issue was all that was at stake in the debate over
whether the absence of a bill of rights rendered the 1787 Constitution flawed. As Akhil Amar has
noted, the Bill of Rights (as ratified, but especially as originally proposed) contained a number of
structural provisions that responded as much to fears of federal intrusion into state prerogatives
as to fears of federal infringements of individual rights. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, loo YALE L.J. 1131, 1137-38 (iggi) (describing the eighteenth-century conception
of the Bill of Rights as primarily structural). But it is easy to overstate this point. Anti-Federalists who initially sought a bill of rights to protect state sovereignty settled for one that focuses its
BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES
51

protection on individual liberty. See Michael Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving Rights, in
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note so, at 343, 343-65 (discussing how, during the course

of the ratification debate in North Carolina, Anti-Federalists gradually adopted the individualcentered conception of rights held by Federalists). In any event, for present purposes it is not
especially important whether the Bill of Rights originally responded more to structural or individual concerns. At the very least, important portions of the Bill of Rights protect and were originally understood to protect individual liberty;, for these portions, the Framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights chose to protect liberty by juxtaposing powers and rights.
52 See Letters from the Federal Farmer (11), supra note 48, at 272.
53 See Brutus, supra note 46, at 315.
54
Ss

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 98-io1

(iggi) (illustrating the indeterminacy of historical argument by asking whether the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment embodies a deeply rooted tradition of separation of church and
state); Michael C. Dorf, A NonoriginalistPerspective on the Lessons of History, ig HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 351, 36o (1996) (arguing that, even when consensus exists concerning the historical
facts, the interpretation of history is a normative enterprise).
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dental as well as targeted burdens because certain key persons or
communities held this position at some important time. Were this my
claim here, I would have to argue, among other things, that the relevant actors' views broadly reflected those of the relevant political community and that they enacted those views into law. However, the
historical argument that I am making here is of a different character.
The point is not that the adoption of the Bill of Rights confirmed a
particular view about incidental burdens. The leading proponents of a
bill of rights did not address such detailed questions as the distinction
between direct and incidental burdens, both because they had larger
issues to confront and because the very concept of judicial protection
of rights against legislative encroachment was in its nascency.5 6 Thus,
I do not contend that the adoption of the Bill of Rights represented
either a wholesale endorsement of all that its proponents (mostly AntiFederalists) believed or a rejection of what its opponents (mostly Federalists) believed. Instead, this brief historical discussion confirms that
the relevant actors during the founding era understood that, but for
the negative limits contained in the Bill of Rights, the enumerated
powers could logically have extended into the zone of protected rights.
As a consequence of the struggle over the Bill of Rights, the structure of the Constitution provides a substantial basis for considering
incidental burdens as infringing rights. Article I sets forth most of the
affirmative powers of the federal government. Because the federal
government is a government of enumerated powers,- 7 it may not take
any action not authorized by an affirmative grant of power. But the
fact that an affirmative power authorizes some governmental action
does not necessarily guarantee its constitutionality. The Constitution
also places negative limits on the federal government's powers,58 and
these negative limits typically take the form of individual rights. By
juxtaposing affirmative powers with negative limits, the Constitution's
architecture assumes that, even when the government pursues a permissible goal, the government might sometimes violate individual
rights - and thus, the negative limits prohibit otherwise valid exercises of power.5 9 This structure strongly suggests protection against
56 For a discussion of the revolutionary era antecedents of judicial review and enforceable
rights, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
175-89 (enlarged ed. 1992). For an account of the experience of the states under the Articles of

Confederation that suggests growing acceptance of the practice of judicial review, see William M.
Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of JudicialReview, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491,
498-500 (1994).
57 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, iiS S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (i995).
58 The Bill of Rights contains most such limits. Others are found in Article I of the Constitu-

tion. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,cl. 2 (establishing that the privilege of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended in peacetime); id. art. I, § 9, cl.3 (prohibiting ex post facto laws).
59 Thus, my structural argument is of a piece with my historical argument. Cf. H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 888 (1985) ("IT]he
original intentionalism was in fact a form of structural interpretation.' .
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incidental burdens which, by definition, consist of burdens arising out
of otherwise permissible exercises of government power.
I should be clear that my argument does not rest on the claim that
the only purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect against incidental
burdens. That claim would be false, for even if one accepts that the
proponents of the Bill of Rights wished to protect rights against encroachment by otherwise valid powers, a bill of rights strictly limited
to protection against direct burdens would still have value. Consider a
hypothetical example based on the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. The Court has held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate commerce, even when the primary motive
behind the legislation is not commercial. 60 Thus, in the course of upholding congressional authority to prohibit racial discrimination of a
private and commercial nature, the Court stated that "the determinative test of the exercise of power by the Congress under the Commerce
Clause is simply whether the activity sought to be regulated is 'commerce which concerns more States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest,"61 adding that "Congress was
not restricted by the fact that the particular obstruction to interstate
commerce with which it was dealing was also deemed a moral and
social wrong."62 Based on this principle, Congress could, pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, prohibit the sale of bumper stickers criticizing
the national government - assuming that automobiles exhibiting
bumper stickers move among the states and that the messages that the
stickers carry bear a substantial relation to the national interest. Of
course, the statute would be unconstitutional under the First Amendment, but not as an incidental burden; rather, the prohibition directly
targets free speech. One might therefore conclude that the negative
limits of the Bill of Rights serve an important purpose even if we ignore incidental burdens; the negative limits ensure that, when Congress uses one of its affirmative powers for a collateral purpose (such
as correcting a social wrong), it pursues only legitimate collateral
purposes.
This example has some force, but it ultimately misconceives the
historical/structural argument for treating incidental burdens as infringing rights. The argument does not purport to show that, absent
recognition of incidental burdens, there would be no point to negative
rights. Were that the nature of the claim, then the bumper sticker
example would refute it. However, the historical/structural argument
aims to show that the best understanding of a document that juxtaposes affirmative powers and negative rights is one that recognizes
that an otherwise generally proper exercise of power can, in specific
60 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
61 Id. at 255.
62 Id. at 257.
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circumstances, infringe a right. The Constitution's architecture reveals

a two-fold strategy for limiting government

-

first, by delegating only

certain powers, and second, by checking valid exercises of those pow-

ers with individual rights. Although logically consistent with a vision
of rights that only protects against direct burdens, the structure more

comfortably fits with a broader role for individual rights.
Moreover, the bumper sticker counterexample is anachronistic. To
be sure, modern commerce clause jurisprudence may permit Congress
to further any purpose through the vehicle of regulating interstate
commerce. 63 But the Framers' generation no doubt had a narrower
understanding of the scope of the Commerce Clause. As Lawrence
Lessig notes, even the Marshall Court's broad readings of the Commerce Clause6 4 reflected the early understanding that the Article I
powers themselves could not be used for illicit - that is, pretextual purposes. 65 On this understanding, laws designed to suppress free
speech in a commercial context would be invalidated as pretextual
uses of the Commerce Clause, 66 even if there had been no First
67
Amendment.

Thus, it may well be the case that, at the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, the principal effect of recognizing rights to primary

conduct that blocked otherwise valid powers was to block incidental
burdens. Most direct burdens would have been seen as pretextual uses

of the enumerated powers and thus invalid on that independent
ground.
Had the Constitution's meaning been permanently fixed in the
eighteenth century, this point would conclude the historical/structural
63 On the other hand, it may not. Cf. United States v. Lopez, i 5 S. Ct. 1624, 163o-31 (1995)
(holding that the possession of a gun in the vicinity of a school is not economic activity that
substantially affects interstate commerce).
64 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.).i, 195-96 (r824) (affirming federal power to
regulate intrastate shipping as encompassed within the power to regulate interstate shipping); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 36, 424 (igi9) (upholding congressional power to charter the Bank of the United States).
65 See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 395, 448 (x995); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 731-32 (1988) ("lit is beyond dispute that [the Framers'] generation
did not believe that everything affected commerce in a constitutionally relevant sense.').
66 See Lessig, supra note 65, at 448 & n.231 (discussing the power of the Supreme Court to
invalidate laws passed "under the pretext of executing [Congress's] powers" (quoting McCulloch,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)) at 423 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67 I do not mean to express confidence in the Court's ability to distinguish between laws
aimed at the commercial aspects of a transaction and those aimed at some other aspect. See
Lopez, x5 S. CL at 1653-54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing the majority's reservation of deferential review for regulations of commercial activity to the pre-1937 Court's effort to distinguish
between direct and indirect regulations of commerce). Nevertheless, earlier generations believed
the distinction an important one, and for this reason, arguments based on congressional omnipotence are anachronistic to the extent that they purport to provide insight into the original
understanding.
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discussion. But of course, important events transpired later. To summarize ruthlessly, two dramatic shifts occurred. First, in the wake of
the Civil War, key negative limits were placed on state power,6 8 limits
which have been interpreted in the twentieth century to be roughly
coextensive with those applicable to the federal government. 69 Second,
at least since the 1930s, the Supreme Court has acquiesced to congressional exercises of power nominally pursuant to the Commerce Clause
which have effectively converted the federal government from a
government of delegated powers to one of nearly plenary power. 70 Do
these changes alter the historical lesson of the enactment of the Bill of
Rights?

Concerning the extension of rights to actions taken by the states, it
would be conceptually coherent to say that, as a matter of structure,
there is still no state analogue to the federal juxtaposition of powers
and rights. States do not derive their affirmative powers from the federal Constitution. Thus, for the states the negative limits are freestanding. One could, consistent with the text and structure of the
Constitution, interpret rights against the states as not including rights
against incidental burdens. But if, as modern constitutional law assumes, the Fourteenth Amendment applies (nearly all of) the rights
against the federal government to the states as well, then the more
natural reading would give those rights the same scope whether applied against the states or the federal government and that has
been the approach generally followed by the Supreme Court.7 1 The
very arguments that lead the Court to conclude that a provision of the
Bill of Rights is fundamental and therefore applicable to the states
typically lead the Court to provide the same level of protection against
68 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i ('No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
69 See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 772-74 (describing the process by which the Supreme
Court "incorporated" most of the protections of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
70 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (2964) (upholding
congressional power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination by a motel
serving interstate travelers); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (upholding congressional power under the Commerce Clause to regulate a farmer's production of a small quantity of
wheat for personal consumption or local sale); United States v. Darby, 32 U.S. 100, 115 (1941)
(upholding congressional power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit interstate shipment of
lumber produced by workers whose compensation violated the national minimum wage or maximum hour standards).
71 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (2962); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 386-87 (1927). There are exceptions, however.
For example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a unanimous jury verdict in all federal
criminal trials but not in state criminal trials. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-71
(2972) (Powell, J.,concurring) (stating that Justice Powell's concurrence also applies to the companion case of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)).
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both state and federal intrusions. 72 If rights against the federal government include protection against incidental burdens, then the same
should be true of rights against the states.
What can we say about the shift from a model of federal delegated
powers to one of virtually plenary power? This change seems to call
into question the original basis for taking incidental burdens seriously:
the juxtaposition of powers and rights. If Article I is read as simply
an awkward way of granting plenary power, then the juxtaposition is
less evident.
This argument is premised on what Laurence Tribe and I have
elsewhere termed a "hyper-integrationist" fallacy. 73 It assumes that the
Constitution that we have now was created all at once in order to
express a single idea. Yet the Framers and ratifiers never decided to
juxtapose federal plenary power with enumerated and unenumerated
rights. Rather, in the early Republic, rights were protected by two
mechanisms: the limited grant of Article I powers and the additional
precaution of the Bill of Rights. As we have seen, the story of the
enactment of these two kinds of protections suggests an interpretation
of rights that protects against incidental as well as targeted burdens.
The question that we must now ask is not how would we understand the scope of the rights protected by a constitution that granted
virtually plenary power to Congress in the first instance. We have no
such constitution. Instead, we must ask how the expansion of federal
power accomplished in the twentieth century bears on the proper understanding of constitutional rights. To the extent that the expansion
of power affects the scope of rights, it would appear to point toward
strengthening rather than weakening the protection of rights. Assuming that protection against incidental burdens plays some normatively
important role in our constitutional scheme (a question which I address in the next section of this Part), the expansion of federal power
should produce greater protection against both incidental and direct
burdens.
With the limits inherent in a government of delegated powers effectively gone, the principal protection for individual rights consists of
negative limits. Thus, it is not surprising that, since it abandoned a
restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 7 4 the Supreme
72

See

TRIBE,

supra note 5,

§ 11-2, at

773

n.25.

73 See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 55, at 24-30; see also I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 86-io3 (iggi) (discussing a version of the same problem, which he terms

"intergenerational synthesis").
74 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918), which had invalidated Congress's prohibition of interstate shipment of
goods produced by child labor). Although United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (i995), invali-

dated a purported exercise of the commerce power, it expressly reaffirmed Darby and the other
twentieth-century cases giving a broad interpretation to the Commerce Clause. See id. at
1628-3o.
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Court has continued to play an extremely active role in the protection

of individual rights (albeit different rights from those that it protected
during the heyday of laissez-faire). In short, the history of the post1789 period in no way undermines and, partly strengthens, the case
for treating incidental burdens as infringements on constitutional

rights.

75

C. Normative Considerations
In addition to constitutional text, history, and structure, normative
considerations 76 play an important role in fixing constitutional meaning.77 In other words, discussion of the question "What does the Con7s One recent event is unsettling because it may signal a departure from the conventional
relation between powers and rights. The proposed I\venty-Eighth Amendment, which passed the
House of Representatives in June of 1995, see Katharine Q. Seelye, House Easily Passes Amendment to Ban Desecration of Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at Ax, provides: "The Congress and
the States shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United
States." Id. at AIg. If one follows the ordinary approach to powers and rights, the Amendment
has no effect. The fact that Congress has the affirmative power to prohibit flag desecration
would not immunize its action from scrutiny under the Constitution's negative limits, including
the First Amendment - just as the fact that the Commerce Clause authorizes the regulation of
bumper stickers on cars moving in interstate commerce does not immunize the hypothetical nobumper-stickers-critical-of-the-government law from First Amendment scrutiny. Under Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which held that a conviction for flag desecration under a Texas
statute was inconsistent with the First Amendment, see id. at 42o, and under United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 3io (r99o), which reached the same conclusion with reference to Congress's
Flag Protection Act, see id. at 312-13, 318-i9, the laws authorized by the Twenty-Eighth Amendment would be prohibited by the First Amendment. And as to the states, the proposed TventyEighth Amendment would appear to be completely unnecessary, because their police power already extends to flag desecration, although that power would be trumped by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Clearly, however, it would be incorrect to read the proposed Tventy-Eighth Amendment in
the manner described above. The obvious purpose of the Amendment is to overrule Johnson and
Eichman. Perhaps Congress would have done better to propose an amendment that read as follows: "Congress shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United
States. The First Amendment to this Constitution shall not be construed to limit this power or
the power of the States to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States." The
apparent departure in Congress's text from the ordinary interplay of powers and rights no doubt
results from sloppy drafting rather than from a reevaluation of our constitutional scheme. Thus,
although it would be inappropriate for the courts to interpret a duly ratified Twenty-Eighth
Amendment as having no effect, it would also be wrong to treat it as signalling a departure from
the long-accepted relation of powers and rights.
76 I refer here to normative concerns derived mostly from sources external to constitutional
text, structure, history, and doctrine. In Philip Bobbitt's terminology, these concerns would include both "ethical" and "prudential" considerations. See BOBrr, supra note 17, at 12-13. To
the extent that Bobbitt's terms imply a distinction between nonconsequentialist and consequentialist arguments, I locate both within the broader category of normative considerations.
77 Laurence Tribe has recently argued that, even when the constitutional text is ambiguous,
interpreters may find sufficient guidance from constitutional structure and the historical circumstances of adoption to point clearly (if not utterly unambiguously) in one direction. See Laurence
H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, IO8 HARv. L. R.v. 1223, 1278-79 (x995). By this measure, normative arguments may be unnecessary to establish that incidental burdens are real infringements of rights.
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stitution mean?" will be informed by, and sometimes even collapse
into, a discussion of the question "What should the Constitution
mean?" Thus, when asking whether the Constitution protects rights
against incidental burdens, we should also ask whether the Constitution ought to protect rights against incidental burdens. I argue in this
section that, whether one takes a deontological or a consequentialist
view, 78 rights ought to be protected against incidental burdens.
A deontological account of rights postulates that it is wrong to violate someone's rights, independent of both the harm to the rightholder
and the benefit for society. As Ronald Dworkin explains, "[i]f someone
has a right to something, then it is wrong for the government to deny
79
it to him even though it would be in the general interest to do so."
In other words, even though some actions would increase aggregate

utility, they are simply off limits because they transgress on individuals' inviolable interests.8 0

Dworkin's view that rights serve as trumps implies that a right
protects against incidental as well as direct burdens. Consider an action by the federal government taken pursuant to some delegated
power. If in a particular case the otherwise valid program substantially interferes with the exercise of an individual's right, the question
inevitably arises whether the power or the right prevails. The concept
of a trump held by the rightholder gives the answer: the very idea that
a right is a trump means that it prevails even when the government is

However, readers who are uneasy with Tribe's implicit suggestion that there is a hierarchy of
constitutional meaning - text trumps structure trumps history trumps normative arguments may wish to consider all sources of constitutional meaning, including normative ones, before deciding any issue.
78 I do not mean to claim that this dichotomy fully captures all possible accounts of rights.
For instance, one could classify political theories as goal-based, right-based, and duty-based. See
J.L. Mackie, Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 8,
at x68, 168 (attributing the division to RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 171-72
(1977)). More radically, one could classify rights as neither consequentialist nor deontological.
See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, OEDIPUS AT FENWAY PARK 32 (1994) ('[R]ights trump both the
right and the good."). I include both right-based and duty-based theories within the deontological
category, -because under either theory, consequentialist arguments do not justify a right. A rightbased theory begins with rights, and for a duty-based theory, rights arise as correlates of duties
without an intervening consequentiaist assessment
79 RONALD DwORKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 269 (1977).

Moral philosophers have developed something of a cottage industry in devising examples
that make this point See, e.g., Gewirth, supra note 8, at 91 & n.i (listing and describing several
sources). My personal favorite is found in Judith J. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J.
1395 (1985). Thomson asks whether a doctor who has five patients in need of transplants may
kill one perfectly healthy patient to harvest her organs. See id. at 1396 (attributing this hypothet80

ical question to Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5
OXFORD REV. 5, 11-13 (1967), reprinted in PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 24, 27-29 (1978)). The operations would increase aggregate
utility, but the actions are nonetheless morally wrong on the deontological ground that they violate the healthy patient's rights.
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pursuing an otherwise important interest. The right is prior to the
1
good.
One might argue that treating rights as trumps is unrealistic.
When push comes to shove, almost no one would seriously contend
that rights always trump powers. Given the choice between, say, pursuing the utility-maximizing course of preventing a nuclear holocaust
versus protecting the freedom of the press by allowing publication of
the
the secret of the hydrogen bomb, it would seem appropriate for
2
government interest to trump the right rather than vice versa.
The considerable force of such an example has led some rightstheorists and courts to reject the concept of absolute rights.8 3 For in8 4
stance, Frederick Schauer depicts rights not as trumps but as shields.
This shield metaphor better characterizes existing Supreme Court doctrine than does the concept of a trump. A right as a shield may be
overcome by a sufficiently compelling interest if the restriction on the
right is narrowly tailored to the compelling interest.8 5 In Schauer's
scheme, we might say that the right shields the rightholder from infringements on behalf of all but the strongest governmental interests.
The move from absolute to qualified rights does not undermine the
case for taking incidental burdens seriously. The shift merely reduces
the degree of protection that rights receive. The metaphor of a shield,
like that of a barrier discussed during the debate over ratification of
the Constitution, 6 implies protection against all manner of infringements. A government interest may sometimes overcome a shield but
not a trump because a shield's strength is finite whereas a trump's
strength is infinite; however, the strength of the barrier has no bearing
on the question7 whether the barrier protects against stray as well as
8
direct attacks.
81 As the play on words illustrates, I mean to associate rights as trumps rather strongly with
deontological accounts of justice. One could of course construct a model of rights in which only
direct burdens trigger the trump. Although such a model would be conceptually coherent, it
would not be the conventional description of rights as trumps. Moreover, this model would be
awkward. The nature of a trump implies that the interests of the trumpholder should initially be
considered independently of the government's justification for its action.
82 See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 99o, 999-iooo (W.D. Wis. x979) (issuing a preliminary injunction against publication of an article entitled "The H-Bomb Secret: How
We Got It, Why We're Telling It"). But see TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-36, at 1053-54 (criticizing
the Progressive decision because the censored information was unclassified and might well have
led to an informed political debate, which would have reduced the risk of nuclear war).
83 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-2, at 792 n.a9 (listing some representative literature in
the academic debate about whether speech rights are absolute).
84 See Schauer, supra note 8, at 428-31.
85 See id. at 430. For one example, consult Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (iggo), which held that a state campaign finance law that prohibits corporations
from using corporate funds for independent expenditures in support of or in opposition to candidates running in state elections satisfies strict scrutiny. See id. at 655.
86 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 44.
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One difficulty with the metaphorical shift from rights as trumps to
rights as shields involves the intellectual coherence of the resulting
conception. As I noted above, the vision of rights as trumps is nonconsequentialist. But if rights bar government actions despite diminutions in overall utility, how can we make sense of a compelling
interest justifying the overriding of a right? In other words, is a right
as a shield compatible with a conception of deontological rights?
This quandary of moral philosophy questions the consistency of the
deontological view of rights and the existing constitutional order.
Whether one can explain or defend that order on nonconsequentialist
grounds is beyond the scope of this Article. 88 I would suggest that
such an explanation - if it exists - also advances the case for taking
incidental burdens seriously. Even if the existing constitutional order
rests on a consequentialist approach to rights, 8 9 however, incidental
burdens still ought to matter.
According to a consequentialist account, people have individual
rights because of a judgment that some goal - such as aggregate happiness or utility - will be best served in the long run by recognizing
rights as a matter of positive law. John Stuart Mill gave the most
famous such account of rights. He defended libertarian principles as
ultimately based on utilitarian ones, stating, "I forgo any advantage

88 The nonconsequentialist could defend her view of rights on two grounds. First, she could
argue that true rights are absolute and therefore that no consequences are sufficiently disastrous
to justify overriding them. See, e.g., Gewirth, supra note 8, at io8 (giving the example of "It]he
right not to be made the intended victim of a homicidal project"). Second, the nonconsequentialist could retreat to abstraction, arguing for example, that the only true rights are rights to dignity
and to political equality. Cf. DwoRmN, supra note 78, at x98-99 (stating that "[a]nyone who
professes to take rights seriously" must recognize the ideas of "human dignity" and "political
equality'). For the abstractionist, specific instances of the government overriding more particular
rights would not count as real infringements because the overriding does not violate dignity and
equality.
Whatever their other merits, neither of these defenses appears to be compatible with our constitutional practice. First, notwithstanding occasional protestations to the contrary by individual
Supreme Court Justices, see, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 481 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting) CI think the First Amendment forbids any kind or type or nature of governmental
censorship over views as distinguished from conduct."), constitutional rights may sometimes be
justifiably overridden under long-accepted practice. Second, the rights protected by the Constitution are often specified at a more particular level than "dignity" and "equality." But see U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures); id. amend. XIV, § i (guaranteeing "equal protection of the laws").
89 To the extent that the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution accepted the existence of
"natural rights" endowed by God and reflected in English common law by happy coincidence, see
BAILYN, supra note 56, at 76-79; WOOD, supa note 48, at 260-65, they preferred to view rights
in nonconsequentialist terms. Thus, with respect to questions that in some way turn upon the
choice between a consequentialist and nonconsequentialist approach, the Framers' intent, so far
as it is relevant, apparently favors the latter.
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from the idea of abstract right, as a thing

independent of utility."90
One might take the view that, although rights are justified on consequentialist grounds, no consequentialist argument should suffice to
override a right in any individual case. In practice, this approach
would be indistinguishable from the nonconsequentialist view.91 Alternatively, a consequentialist might believe that the ultimate political
goal (for example, maximum utility) will be best served if rights only
act as presumptive limits - that is, as shields. In either case, the
right derives from a consequentialist calculus.
Virtually any consequentialist account of rights will recognize that
at least some incidental burdens ought to be treated as infringements.
A consequentialist will typically wish to protect a right as a means of
advancing some interest of importance to the rightholder. If people
will have greater utility if they are able to do x, then the consequentialist will affirmatively value the right to do x, not merely the right to
be free from regulation on account of doing x. A law of general applicability that incidentally burdens a person's right to do x denies that
person the utility that she would otherwise derive from doing x. 9 2 In
short, incidental burdens will matter to the consequentialist.
Whether one conceives of rights as prepolitical entitlements or as
positive enactments designed to advance some conception of the good,
they ought to have protection against incidental as well as targeted
burdens. Thus, normative considerations support the same inference
as the one gleaned from constitutional text, history, and structure. Because the Constitution appears to protect against infringement of
rights by incidental burdens, one must now confront the practical
90 JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in JOHN S. MILL, THREE ESSAYS I, 16
(1975). Mill's critics portray On Liberty "as a moving rhetorical document, the philosophical significance of which consists of the nonutilitarian insights illegitimately smuggled in by Mill," FRED

R. BERGER, HAPPINESS, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
JOHN STUART MILL 227 (1984), a conclusion that Berger contests, see id. at 226-78.
91 See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 73, at 12 (advancing a conception of American constitutional-

ism, founded ultimately on consensus, that nonetheless "allows an important place for . . . 'rights
as trumps,'" because they are placed beyond the realm of ordinary politics by constitutional politics); DWORKIN, supra note 78, at igg n.a (stating that "this sort of 'institutional' utilitarianism" is
consistent with his general approach "because it argues that we must treat violations of dignity
and equality as special moral crimes, beyond the reach of ordinary utilitarian justification').
92 One could also invoke this reasoning to argue that a right to x entails a right to a government subsidy for x or a right to x that is enforceable against private actors, because from the
perspective of the rightholder, it matters little whether the government or her impecuniousness
prevents her from exercising the right. Resistance to recognizing positive rights and rights against
private actors, however, should not translate into resistance to treating incidental burdens as infringements. Two concerns typically motivate the law's failure to recognize positive rights and
rights against private actors. First, the courts may lack the institutional competence to engage in
the wholesale redistribution that government subsidization requires. Second, a constitution should
only specify the powers of and limits on government, not private actors. Incidental burdens no
more strongly implicate these concerns than do direct burdens.

x996]

INCIDENTAL BURDENS

1199

problem of how to recognize incidental burdens without invalidating
all legislation - that is, the floodgates concern. As I discuss in the
next section, current Supreme Court doctrine attempts to reconcile
these theoretical and practical considerations by treating incidental
burdens as infringements on constitutional rights in some, but not all,
circumstances.
"1. CURRENT DOCTRINE

Before examining how the Supreme Court has treated incidental
burdens, it will be useful to sketch the universe of possible approaches. There are at least six primary ways of approaching incidental burdens. First, the Court could treat all incidental burdens in the
same manner as it treats direct burdens on fundamental rights - that
is, the Court could apply strict scrutiny. Second, the Court could subject all incidental burdens to some form of heightened scrutiny that is
less stringent than the standard applicable to direct burdens. Third,
the law could recognize only some incidental burdens as infringements
of constitutional rights and treat these burdens in the same manner as
it treats direct burdens, but ignore other incidental burdens. Fourth,
the Court could recognize only some incidental burdens as infringements of constitutional rights and subject them to some form of
heightened scrutiny that is less stringent than the standard applicable
to direct burdens. Fifth, the law could entirely ignore incidental burdens for constitutional purposes. Sixth, the law could treat incidental
burdens in a completely ad hoc or intuitionist manner, responding to
the facts of each case absent any rule-based doctrine. 93
The third and fourth approaches represent the best options for a
general doctrine. The first two approaches would jeopardize government's ability to function, because they would require judicial scru94
tiny, if not judicial invalidation, of nearly all government regulation.
Unless one cannot find any principled distinctions among types of incidental burdens, the fifth approach would appear unnecessarily drastic.
The sixth approach may have much to recommend it - and, no
doubt, much constitutional law is ad hoc - but this method, by definition, cannot undergird a general doctrine. Ad hoc balancing would
seem to be a fallback, rather than a starting, position. Thus, only the

93 A variant of the sixth possibility would be to apply distinct rules to incidental burdens on
different rights.
94 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental
Restrictions on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 779, 784 (r985) ('To be concerned
significantly, in a constitutional sense, with incidental effects is to be committed to judicial scrutiny of an enormous range of government decisions."); Stone, supra note ii, at 1S.
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third and fourth options offer a reasonably complete doctrine that
treats incidental burdens seriously without crippling government. 9
The choice between approach three and approach four is a choice
between strict scrutiny and something akin to intermediate scrutiny.
Although that decision can be important,96 I focus on the similarities
of these two approaches rather than on their differences. Under either
option, the most difficult issue will be distinguishing those incidental
burdens that trigger some level of heightened judicial scrutiny from
those that trigger none. 97 Consideration of the Supreme Court's linedrawing efforts in this area illustrates the difficulty in making this
distinction.
Analysis of the Court's treatment of incidental burdens is complicated by the fact that no unified constitutional doctrine of incidental
burdens currently exists. Instead, the Supreme Court has generally
confined its assessment of incidental burdens on a particular right to
the jurisprudence involving only that right. In the following sections
of this Part, I describe and critique the Court's treatment of incidental
burdens in three areas: free speech, free exercise of religion, and the
unenumerated right to privacy. Despite the Court's fragmented approach, I focus as much on the often overlooked similarities posed by
incidental burdens arising in these areas as on the differences.
A.

Incidental Burdens on Speech

Both the case law and the academic treatment of incidental burdens on free speech are enormous, and I do not attempt anything like
a comprehensive summary here. 98 At the risk of vastly oversimplifying, much free speech doctrine depends on whether a challenged regu95 In distinguishing between ad hoc balancing and heightened scrutiny, I do not intend to
suggest that the application of heightened scrutiny involves no balancing. I agree with Stephen
Gottlieb that "[s]trict scrutiny is a form of balancing with a rigorous burden of proof placed on
government." Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests and Constitutional Discourse, 55 ALB. L. REv. 549, 55I (1992). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental Interests
and UnconstitutionalConditions Law: A Case Study in Categorizationand Balancing, 55 ALB. L.
REv. 605, 6o6 (1992) (contending that, in practice, rational basis review and strict scrutiny repre-

sent categorical rather than balancing approaches, whereas only "[i]ntermediate scrutiny is real
balancing'). In the present context, the important question is whether a rightholder must make
some threshold showing before a court will undertake administratively costly review.
96 See infra pp. 1202-04.
97 See Schauer, supra note 94, at 790-91 (noting the "floodgates" problem for those who
would recognize "exceptions" to what Schauer perceives to be the current practice whereby the
law usually ignores incidental burdens).
98 For a small sample of the excellent commentary on incidental burdens in the free speech
area, consult TRIBE, cited above in note 5,§§ 12-2 to -8, at 789-841; Larry A. Alexander, Rouble
on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921

passim (1993); John H. Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 passim (1975); and, Susan H.
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 6x5, 722-28
(1991).
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lation is content-based or content-neutral. 99 Content-based regulations

aim at the communicative impact of communicative activity, whereas
content-neutral regulations merely have an adverse effect on communicative opportunity. 10 0 As Geoffrey Stone notes, in practice the Court
applies a deferential standard of review to most content-neutral restrictions,' 0 ' including incidental burdens that arise from content-neutral
restrictions. 0 2 Stone summarizes the Court's approach to incidental
burdens as follows:
The general presumption is that incidental restrictions do not raise a

question of first amendment review. The presumption is waived, however, whenever an incidental restriction either has a highly disproportionate impact on free expression or directly penalizes expressive activity.
And the latter exception is applied quite liberally whenever the challenged restriction significantly limits the opportunities for free
03
expression.'
Examples that illustrate Stone's general proposition abound. For
instance, "newspapers can properly be made to comply with the antitrust laws, to obey generally applicable labor laws, and to pay taxes
imposed under a generally applicable tax scheme."10 4 Any contention
that speakers should be exempt from such government regulation is at
best impractical in light of the pervasiveness of government regulation
in the modern state.'0 5 Nonetheless, incidental burdens frequently
arise that present at least a strong prima facie case for heightened
g9 The scope and even the existence of the content-neutrality requirement vary significantly
from context to context See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 17-33 (iggo); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the
First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV 1, 21-28.
100 See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-2, at 790.

101 See Stone, supra note it, at 50-52. Recent cases suggest a greater willingness by the Court
to apply a more stringent form of intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulations of speech.
See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 1r4 S. Ct 2526, 2523, 2530 (1994) (treating an
injunction against antiabortion protestors' activities outside a health clinic as content-neutral, but
nonetheless invalidating portions of the injunction as imposing greater burdens on speech than
necessary); Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 14 S. Ct. 2445, 2461-62, 2469-72 (ig94) (plurality
opinion) (treating the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 as content-neutral and finding a substantial government interest, but
remanding for application of the narrow-tailoring prong of the test from United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
102 See Stone, supra note it, at 105-r4.
103 Id. at 114.

104 Schauer, supra note 94, at 779-80 (citing inter alia Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579 (I983) (invalidating a special use tax on newspaper and ink); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 135 (1969) (antitrust); and,
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192 (1946) (labor)).
os Moreover, any form of heightened scrutiny for all incidental burdens could be costly, because one cannot assume that the government's asserted interest will inevitably justify the regula-

tion. For example, is the government's interest in the marginal increase in revenue that it derives
from taxes on newspapers sufficiently compelling? Additionally, even if the challenged regulation
would survive heightened scrutiny, litigation expenses may preclude the government from defending such a regulation in court.
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scrutiny. The leading case of United States v. O'Brien 0 6 presents the
starting point for deciding whether an incidental burden on speech
triggers such scrutiny.
In O'Brien, the defendant was prosecuted under a federal statute
that prohibited the knowing destruction or mutilation of draft cards. 0 7
Although O'Brien had burned his draft card as a communicative act
of political protest, 0 8 the Court did not conclude on this basis alone
that the First Amendment was implicated. The Court rejected "the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby
to express an idea." 0 9 It then announced a four-prong test applicable
to regulations not aimed at expression but which have the effect of
restricting symbolic speech: first, the regulation must be "within the
constitutional power of the Government"; second, it must further "an
important or substantial governmental interest"; third, that interest
must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"; and fourth,
"the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must
be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."" 0
Prong one is not properly part of First Amendment law, because
all regulation must be within the government's constitutional
power."' Prong three merely restates the proposition that the challenged regulation must be content-neutral - which is a precondition
for the application of the test in the first instance. The O'Brien test
thus can be distilled into a two-part requirement that formally resembles conventional intermediate scrutiny: a regulation must serve a substantial government interest and must be narrowly tailored to that end
2
in order to pass constitutional muster."
The Court has made clear, however, that the narrow tailoring element of the O'Brien test does not require that the regulation be the

106 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
107 See id. at 369-70.
108 See Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech Methodology, 19 ARIz. ST. LJ.635, 635
(1987) (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70; and, Brief for David Paul O'Brien at 6, O'Brien (No.
232), reprinted in 65 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES So0, 81g (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)).
109 O'Bnen, 391 U.S. at 376.
110 Id. at 377. Over the years, the Court has applied the O'Brien test not only to cases of
incidental burdens on symbolic speech, such as burning a draft card or sleeping in a park as acts
of political protest, see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984),
but also to content-neutral regulations that directly burden speech, see Werhan, supra note 1o8, at
637-38 & nn.9-14.
III For federal laws, this prong means that Congress must be exercising one of its enumerated
powers. So far as the federal Constitution is concerned, the states' powers are plenary.
112 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating that "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives").
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least restrictive means of achieving the state interest." 3 As John Hart
Ely observed, in the O'Brien context narrow tailoring requires "only
that there be no less restrictive alternative capable of serving the
state's interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation under
4 This approach amounts to no more than a prohibition on
attack.""1
"gratuitous inhibition of expression."" s In contrast, classic heightened
scrutiny of more traditional forms of expression asks "whether the
marginally greater effectiveness of [the challenged restriction on
the same objective]
speech] relative to alternative means of [achieving
' 6
justifies the greater burden on communication." "

113 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1989). Although Ward is a time,

place, and manner case, the Court stated that the O'Brien standard and the time, place, and
manner standard are similar. See id.at 798 ("[Tlhe O'Brien test '... . is little, if any, different

from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.'" (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at
298)); see also Alexander, supra note 98, at 928 ("[Tihe Court is correct, from a theoretical standpoint, in employing the same test for both areas."); David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standardsfor the Free Speech Clause, 19 Amiz. ST. LJ.I95, 214-15 (1987) (noting

the apparent merger of the historically distinct O'Brien test and the time, place, and manner test).
The domain of the O'Brien and Ward test now also includes commercial speech. See Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (i989) (terming the tests "substantially similar" (quoting San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987))).
But cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. CL 1505, 1516-17 (1993) (invalidat-

ing a municipal regulation prohibiting placement of commercial but not noncommercial newsracks
on public property). Ashutosh Bhagwat has noted the oddity that in Discovery Network the
Court forbade a city from relying on the very categories that the Court's own First Amendment
jurisprudence had created. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REv. 141, 163
n.ior (1995).
114 Ely, supra note 98, at 1484-85.
115 Id. at 1485.
116 Id. at 1486-87. Note that when Ely made these observations in 1975, one could plausibly

have argued that the Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence consisted of four distinct tests.
First, the Court sometimes held that content-based speech restrictions were per se invalid unless
the speech fell within a proscribable category. See id. at 149o-gi (discussing Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam)). Second, the Court applied bona fide heightened scrutiny
to content-neutral laws directed at traditional speech. See id. at 1486-87 (discussing the handbill
ban invalidated in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 16o, x62 (1939)). Third, the Court applied the
no-gratuitous-regulation approach of O'Brien to some instances of speech mixed with conduct.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Fourth, the Court applied no special First
Amendment scrutiny to incidental burdens arising out of laws having no obvious connection to
speech. See, e.g., Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. I31, 139-140 (1969) (holding

that newspapers lack immunity from the antitrust laws). The second, third, and fourth tests continue to exist essentially unchanged, but the per se rule appears to have collapsed into the second
test. Thus, all content-based speech restrictions are now judged by the same strict scrutiny standard applied to content-neutral regulations of traditional speech. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (ig99) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the majority's application of strict scrutiny and proposing the
alternative of per se invalidation of content- and speaker-based restrictions of speech); see also
Alexander, supra note 98, at 926 (employing a different typology, which includes a distinct category for "cases where government is using the mechanisms of the affirmative state, not to censor
others' messages, but to communicate its own messages").
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Given that the O'Brien test asks so little in principle, it should not
be surprising that it means so little in practice. In some sense, the
O'Brien test is the worst of all possible worlds. A large category of
content-neutral laws is susceptible to an O'Brien challenge. Litigation
over regulations in this category imposes substantial costs on society
but yields few tangible benefits. Because most of the challenged laws
will survive, most of the cases actually litigated will not benefit free
speech. Nor does the prospect of O'Brien scrutiny deter potentially
speech-chilling laws, because legislators enacting content-neutral laws
will not ordinarily contemplate free speech issues: by definition, such
laws are aimed at problems that do not arise from the communicative
impact of speech. 117 Thus, if O'Brien scrutiny is to remain toothless,
8
it hardly seems worth retaining as a discrete First Amendment test."1
Before completely abandoning the O'Brien test - and thus forsaking the possibility of reconciling free speech doctrine with the insight
that incidental burdens matter - we should ask whether the test can

be improved. The obvious first step would be to bring its application
into line with its language. Because the O'Brien test, by its terms,
resembles heightened (if not strict) scrutiny, we might ask whether a
sensible doctrine could be constructed that would apply some form of
truly heightened scrutiny to some class of incidental burdens on
speech. We would have to find a way to avoid the application of
heightened scrutiny to a "limitless variety of conduct."1' 9 The
Supreme Court suggested a methodology for accomplishing this task in

117 One might be tempted to point to O'Brien itself as a counterexample. In that case, Congress clearly understood, and indeed intended, the law to penalize antidraft expression. But this
point merely highlights that the O'Brien Court misapplied the test that it announced. In nearly
all instances, the knowing destruction or mutilation of a draft card was undoubtedly undertaken
to communicate a message. The mere fact that one can hypothesize unusual circumstances under
which a given law reaches only noncommunicative conduct - for example, someone burning a
draft card for warmth - does not render a content-based regulation content-neutral. The
O'Brien Court misapplied the third prong of its test because the government interest in preventing draft card destruction and mutilation was not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
118 See Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker's Intent, 1z CONST. COMMENT. 21, 26
(1995) (contending that heightened judicial scrutiny of content-neutral laws "has been an extremely unsuccessful jurisprudential exercise, with only a few very arbitrary victories for speakers
in a period of over fifty years," and that it "should be dropped from first amendment analysis");
Alexander, supra note 98, at 925. The Supreme Court itself has sometimes flirted with this approach. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., Soi U.S. 663, 669 (iggi) (noting that "generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
5oi U.S. 56o, 576 (iggi) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "a general law not
specifically targeted at expressive conduct, [does not in] its application to such conduct... implicate the First Amendment").
119 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 120 in which the Court subjected an inci12 1
dental burden on speech to no First Amendment scrutiny at all.
In Arcara, a New York statute authorizing the closure of any
building being used for "prostitution" or "lewdness" was applied to a
store that sold sexual (but not obscene) books, because the store was in
fact used as a place of prostitution and open sexual conduct. 22 The
Supreme Court rejected the storeowner's claim that some form of
heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment was appropriate. The
Court did not even apply O'Brien.123.

After stating what it saw as the general principle that incidental
burdens raise no constitutional issue, 24 the Arcara Court suggested
two exceptions. First, the Court observed that incidental restrictions
that "impose a disproportionate burden upon those engaged in protected First Amendment activities" trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny.125

This category comprises regulations that, although

formally not directed at expression, apply to speech so disproportionately as to suggest that the government is targeting speech. A law
imposing a special tax on ink is one example.' 26 So too is a law banning all flag burning, because the burning of a flag is almost always a
communicative activity. This first exception really rests upon a judgment that laws subjecting speech to grossly disproportionate burdens
2
are not incidental burdens at all.

7

Second, the Court noted that First Amendment scrutiny applies
when a law penalizes expressive activity. 128 This exception can be illustrated by contrasting O'Brien with Arcara. In O'Brien, the activity
U.S. 697 (i986).
id. at 706-07.
id. at 698-7oo.
id. at 7o6-07.
id. at 704-o5.
125 Id. at 704.
126 See Minneapolis Star & Thbune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 46o U.S. 575, 578
(1983). Note that the government's targeting of expression need not, however, reflect an illicit
motive in order to trigger strict scrutiny. See id. at 592 ("We need not and do not impugn the
motives of the Minnesota Legislature in passing the ink and paper tax."). See generally infra
section llI.A (discussing the distinction between targeted regulations and purposefully restrictive
regulations).
127 It may appear problematic to focus on the likelihood that an activity will be communicative. But it should be noted that such an inquiry is unavoidable. Even what we normally term
"pure" speech is only communicative in nearly all cases, rather than all cases. A law prohibiting
"uttering words disrespectful of the government" targets the communicative impact of speech,
notwithstanding the fact that someone might utter words disrespectful of the government without
intending to express any message. For example, a person recovering from reconstructive jaw surgery might recite such a speech solely as a means of exercising her jaw. Cf. Akhil R. Amar, The
Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, io6 HRv. L. REV. 124, 133-34
(1992) (noting that spoken or printed words are acts that typically communicate); Tribe, supra
note 27, at 32 (discussing "activities that are usually associated with or engaged in solely for the
purpose of expressing certain messages or ideas")..
128 See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706-07 & n.3.
120 478
121 See
122 See
123 See
124 See
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that triggered the penalty - destruction or mutilation of a draft card
- was communicative, at least from the perspective of the private
actor. In Arcara, the activities that triggered the penalty - prostitution and open sexual conduct - were not communicative, even from
the private actor's perspective. The burden on speech could have
been entirely avoided had the bookstore owner refrained from engaging in the unprotected, noncommunicative activity. 12 9 Although there
certainly was state action in the constitutional sense, the burden on
speech was not directly attributable to the government; rather, the private actor's decision to connect the noncommunicative activity with
130
the selling of books created the burden on speech.
Consider an example taken from Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Arcara. A law prohibiting speeding may delay a motorist who happens to be a television newscaster, and thereby interfere with his abil13 1
ity to engage in the communicative activity of announcing the news.
Yet we would not subject the law, when applied to the speeding newscaster, to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. According
32
to Justice O'Connor, Arcara is a similar case.
Nevertheless, the hypothetical speeding newscaster actually poses a
more difficult problem than is immediately apparent. The activities
that triggered the penalty in Arcara - prostitution and open sexual
conduct - were not communicative, even from the private actor's
perspective. At first, it may appear that the same is true of the
newscaster, who does not intend to send any message through speeding. However, the noncommunicative act of speeding does, from the
newscaster's perspective, at least facilitate expression, because it permits him to arrive at the studio in time for the broadcast. Moreover,
the same can be said of the prostitution and open sexual conduct at
issue in Arcara: these activities presumably played some role in enhancing the profitability of the sale of (presumptively protected) books
and thus, from the storeowner's perspective, they facilitated book
sales. The newscaster example and Arcara itself thus suggest a need

129 I make the suggestion that banning unprotected noncommunicative activity raises no First
Amendment problems tentatively. As Sherry Colb has noted, the distinction between prohibiting
a protected activity and punishing an unprotected activity by depriving a person of a fundamen-

tal right may not be constitutionally significant. See Sherry F. Colb, Freedomfrom Incarceration:
Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 803-13 (x994) (argu-

ing that the penalty of imprisonment deprives the prisoner of the fundamental right to liberty,
and thus criminal laws that call for imprisonment should be subject to strict scrutiny even when
the underlying activity criminalized is not itself constitutionally privileged).
130 Although I once found this distinction between O'Brien and Arcara essential, see TRIBE &

DORF, supra note 55, at 35-36, I am no longer persuaded that it provides a complete answer to
the incidental burden puzzle.
131 See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132 See id.
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for distinguishing between activities that merely facilitate expression
133
and those that are, in and of themselves, truly communicative.
Looking to facilitation, however, may be problematic because one
can always isolate the noncommunicative elements of communicative
conduct and characterize them as facilitative of the expression. Thus,
in O'Brien the physical act of burning the draft card could be said to
facilitate expression of hostility to the draft. To be sure, in O'Brien
the communicative and noncommunicative elements were intertwined
in a way that they were not entangled in Arcara or the newscaster
example. However, from the speaker's perspective, there may be no
important difference between a burden on an act that facilitates expression and a burden on an act that is more highly intertwined with
expression. As Ely put it, "burning a draft card to express opposition
to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, ioo% action and ioo%
1 34
expression."
Moreover, even if one believes that the categories of facilitative
and speech-intertwined acts can be distinguished, it is not clear that
they should be. At issue in Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 35 for example, was the application of a federal regulation
that prohibited most camping in national parks to persons who wished
to sleep in a park opposite the White House for the purpose of protesting government policy with respect to the homeless. 13 6 The Clark
Court applied O'Brien scrutiny. 137 This level of scrutiny appears to be
the right one, because the message was intertwined with the physical
act of sleeping. Suppose, however, that the regulation instead had prohibited "entering or remaining in the park after nightfall." Applied to
the same protestors, such a regulation could be said to burden only an
act that facilitates communication rather than one that is intertwined
with communication. The protestors' message would not be intertwined with the act of entering or remaining in the park; these acts
would merely facilitate sleeping in the park - which itself would be
intertwined with their message. Yet it would be odd to subject the
sleeping prohibition to greater scrutiny than the entering or remaining
prohibition when neither aims at communication and both have the
incidental effect of burdening the same communication.
133 The Supreme Court suggested such a distinction in Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984) (explaining that the "major value to this demonstration [of
sleeping in Lafayette Park] would be facilitative").
134 Ely, supra note 98, at 1495. I believe that Ely's point is not that the lines between facilitative and intertwined acts are difficult to draw, but that they are inevitably artificial. But see
Williams, supra note 98, at 723-24 (placing the speeding-newscaster hypothetical in a category of
"incidental" burdens that do not even affect facilitative acts, and arguing that communicative,
facilitative, and other activities lie along a spectrum).
135 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
136 See id. at 294.
137 See id. at 293.
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If one finds that the distinction between acts that facilitate speech
and acts that are intertwined with speech is an inadequate basis upon
which to build an incidental burden doctrine, one response would be
to apply O'Brien scrutiny to both categories. But if that were done,
the domain of O'Brien would be too broad, because a virtually limitless number of regulable activities can be "communicative" (in the
sense of intertwined with or facilitative of speech). Indeed, even if one
adheres to the facilitative/intertwined distinction and only scrutinizes
burdens on the latter category, O'Brien's reach appears too broad.
For example, a residential zoning ordinance may prevent the operation
of a theater, bookstore, or newspaper plant at a particular site.' 3 8 Yet
in the zoning case, the attempt to run a theater, bookstore, or newspaper is, like O'Brien but arguably not like Arcara, intertwined with the
noncommunicative element of operating a commercial establishment.
Perhaps because of the O'Brien test's broad scope, the Court has
applied it in a manner that is extremely deferential to the government.
As a means of controlling the floodgates, this approach may be sensible, but the result has often sanctioned severe incidental burdens. 139
Consequently, the Court has produced an incidental burden doctrine
with a too-broad domain and a too-weak practical effect.
Although sometimes characterized as a distinct aspect of free
speech law, the doctrines governing time, place, and manner regulations of speech in a public forum suggest a workable approach to the
incidental burden question. As Frederick Schauer observes, public forum doctrine represents an exception to the general First Amendment
principle that the courts will not closely scrutinize incidental regulations. 140 For example, suppose that a city ordinance prohibiting "all
activities that have the potential to block pedestrian traffic on a sidewalk" were applied to a person making a political speech on the sidewalk around whom a crowd had gathered. 14 Although the ordinance
imposes only an incidental burden on speech, its application would be
judged by heightened scrutiny. 42 Public forum doctrine recognizes
that, by denying speakers access to those areas in which potential lis138 Note that such an ordinance would have only an incidental effect on expression, in contrast
with zoning ordinances targeted at particular kinds of expression. But see Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-50 (1986) (applying the O'Brien test to a zoning ordinance limited
to theaters showing sexually explicit films, because the regulation targeted the "secondary effects"
of such films).
139 See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 298-99.
140 See Schauer, supra note 94, at 788-89.
141 See id. at 788 (giving this example).
142 See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-24, at 987 ("The 'public forum' doctrine holds that restrictions on speech should be subject to higher scrutiny when, all other things being equal, that
speech occurs in areas playing a vital role in communication - such as in those places histori-

cally associated with first amendment activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks.').
Schauer's hypothetical ordinance could not be sustained as a time, place, or manner regulation,
because it forecloses all opportunities to use the sidewalks for large-scale communicative activity.
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teners are most likely to concentrate, even a law not directed at speech
can amount to an infringement of the right to free speech, because it
1 43
substantially interferes with a vital means of exercising the right.
The Court's time, place, and manner test similarly suggests that
the concern underlying public forum doctrine is the ability of speakers
to communicate effectively. Even in a public forum, the government
may impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions if it
leaves open adequate alternative channels of communication. 144 For
example, a prohibition on sound trucks in residential neighborhoods is
permissible, notwithstanding its restrictive effect on expression, in part
because speakers may be able to communicate their messages nearly as
45
effectively through less disruptive means.'
Time, place, and manner doctrine suggests a means of distinguishing between significant and insignificant incidental burdens: only those
incidental burdens that do not leave open adequate alternative chan46
nels of communication should be subject to heightened scrutiny.
Most time, place, and manner restrictions impose direct burdens on
speech, because they apply exclusively to communicative activity. But
because a valid time, place, and manner regulation must be contentneutral, it, like the archetypal incidental burden, will be directed at
the noncommunicative aspects of the regulated activity. 4 7 Indeed, the
Court has recently held that the incidental burden test for free speech
14
and the time, place, and manner test are substantially the same.
Therefore, whatever its official shape, free speech doctrine requires
close scrutiny of an incidental burden on speech only when the burden

143 It may appear odd to treat public forum doctrine as a subset of incidental burden doctrine,
because for example, a government decision to bulldoze a park - thereby incidentally rendering
speech in the park impossible - would raise no First Amendment issue. See International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2718 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("In some sense the government always retains authority to close a public forum, by
selling the property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal use."). The inconsistency is more apparent than real, however. Once the government property loses its public forum
character, the public will find other places to congregate, presumably in other public fora. At
that point, potential speakers will need access to these other places. To the extent that the disappearance of traditional public spaces results in public congregation in places that do not constitute
traditional public fora, the Court's recent reluctance to recognize that a nontraditional public
space can constitute a public forum, see id. at 2717 (criticizing the Court's holding that a government-owned airport is not a public forum), undermines the purpose of public forum doctrine.
144 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
14S See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 82-83, 89 (I949).
146 See Schauer, supra note 94, at 791 (suggesting that a successful limiting principle for incidental burden doctrine might "focus on alternative channels of communication").
147 See, e.g., Ward, 49r U.S. at 803 (upholding the requirement that musical performers in
New York's Central Park utilize the city's sound engineer as a content-neutral regulation aimed
at reducing the decibel level of concerts); Schauer, supra note 94, at 791.
148 See supra note 113 (discussing Ward).
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only subforecloses an essential avenue of communication. In short,
149
scrutiny.
heightened
trigger
burdens
incidental
stantial
This account leaves us with a number of practical puzzles. How
do we determine whether an incidental burden is substantial? In order to trigger heightened scrutiny, must a law foreclose all alternative
avenues of communication or only some of them? At what level of
generality do we describe the speaker's chosen means of expression
and the putative alternatives? For example, is the possibility of distributing homemade videotape cassettes an adequate alternative means
of disseminating a video message for someone who cannot afford to
purchase time on broadcast or cable television?' 5 0 To what extent may
one medium substitute for another one?' 5 ' I do not attempt to answer
these practical questions here, because they cannot be adequately addressed in the abstract.
As a general matter, free speech doctrine treats substantial incidental burdens as raising a bona fide constitutional problem and ignores
most other incidental burdens. Although the Court has not expressly
justified its approach in such terms, the doctrine appears to be a reasonable compromise between the reasons for taking incidental burdens
seriously and the floodgates concern.
B. Incidental Burdens on Free Exercise of Religion
In Employment Division v. Smith,'5 2 the Supreme Court adopted a
simple rule for judging the constitutionality of a law imposing an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion. According to Smith,
essentially all incidental burdens imposed by neutral laws are constitutional.' 53 Only laws that single out religious conduct for particular
149 Note that I am equating two requirements that the Court's doctrine apparently treats as
distinct: the requirement that time, place, and manner regulations leave open adequate alternative
means of expression, and the prohibition on foreclosing an essential avenue of communication.
Both of these requirements derive from a basic concern that communication rights should not be
substantially burdened.
150 We might choose to ignore all incidental burdens that operate through a private actor's
indigence. Although such an approach would be broadly consistent with the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to recognize positive rights, see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (99o)
(upholding a prohibition on abortion-related counseling by doctors working for federally funded
family planning clinics); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (198o) (upholding state funding of all
medical treatments except abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1977) (rejecting constitutional challenges to state prohibitions on the use of Medicaid benefits for funding abortions), the
Court has recognized that the impact of a law on "the poorly financed causes of little people" is a
relevant consideration in free speech analysis, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 n.3o (1984) (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 39 U.S. 141, 246 (1943)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see infra section ]II.D.
5S1 Cf. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (ggi) (upholding a generally applicable state
sales tax that applied to cable television operators but not to print media or satellite broadcasters).
152 494 U.S. 872 (199o).

See id."at 877-79. In an effort to reconcile its holding with prior precedent, the Smith
Court recognized two exceptions to its blanket principle. First, cases involving a "hybrid" of free
1s3
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15 4
burdens trigger heightened scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause.
Regardless of the actual impact of a law on a particular religious practice, the law will be upheld without any inquiry into the strength or
weakness of the government interest.
The rule of Smith has been severely criticized.'- 5 Justice Souter,
who joined the Court after Smith was decided, has even suggested
that Smith should be overruled as unsound and inconsistent with

cases that it purported to leave undisturbed as good law.'5 6 Criticism

of Smith has not been confined to academic or judicial circles. With
broad support from both major political parties and diverse interest
groups,- 7 Congress passed and the President signed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 55 which provides significant statutory protection against incidental burdens on the free exercise of religion. RFRA provides that "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability,"'5 9 unless the burden imposed is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.' 60
exercise and other constitutional rights would not be subject to the Court's rule, presumably because such rights would receive robust protection independently. See id. at 881 (placing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972), in this category). Second, the Court distinguished claims for
religious exceptions to unemployment eligibility rules, because of the possibility of "individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct." Id. at 884 (classifying Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (i98i), under this exception); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The ConstitutionalBasis for ProtectingReligious Conduct, 6I U. CHi. L. REv. 1245, 1287 (i994)
(accepting the second distinction, because a regime of ad hoc administrative exceptions threatens
unequal treatment of minority religions).
IS4 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225-26
(1993) (invalidating a series of ordinances because they singled out ritual animal sacrifice by practitioners of the Santeria faith for prohibition).
155 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 199 o Sup. CT. Rlv. i, i;Ira C.
Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 230, 250-53 (i994); McConnell, supra note 14, at iiii; see also David L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Work-

place: An Analysis of the EEOC's Proposed Guidelines, 56 MONT. L. REv. 1i9, 119 n.2 (i995)
(citing a number of sources critical of Smith). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith
arid Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 308, 309 (ig9) (approving the result but not
the reasoning of Smith).
156 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 113 S. Ct. at 2240-50 (Souter, J.,concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
157 See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The ConstitutionalSignificance of an UnconstitutionalStatute, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39, 39 (I995) ("RFRA was supported by
a legion of divergent interest groups, and it garnered virtually unanimous support in both the
House and the Senate."); Gustave Niebuhr, Disparate Groups Unite Behind Civil Rights Bill on
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993, at A7 (citing support of 68 diverse religious and
civil liberties groups); Senate Votes to Protect Religion, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1993, at A8 (noting
Senate approval by a 97-2 margin).
158 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb (Supp. V 1993)).
IS9 Id. § 2ooobb-i(a).
160 See id. § 2ooobb-i(b).
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Serious questions have been raised regarding the constitutionality

of RFRA. According to one district court's view, RFRA violates separation of powers principles because Congress may not substitute its
constitutional views for those of the Court. 161 Others claim that, inso162
far as RFRA limits the states and not just the federal government,

Congress lacks the affirmative power to enact RFRA under either the
Commerce Clause or Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 163 A

third view focuses on equality norms. It suggests that the faithful application of RFRA will sometimes favor religious persons or institu-

tions over nonreligious ones in a manner that violates establishment,
164
equal protection, and free speech principles.

Although these views pose difficult and fascinating questions, for
present purposes I assume the constitutionality of RFRA and inquire

into its meaning. RFRA suggests a potentially useful approach to the
problem of incidental burdens, regardless whether we consider the
problem to be one of statutory construction, constitutional interpretation, or purely academic speculation.

The language of RFRA reflects a compromise between the two
considerations upon which this Article has focused. On the one hand,
RFRA expressly recognizes that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may

burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with
religious exercise."

65

On the other hand, in an apparent effort to

161 See Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352
(5th Cir. 1996); see also Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications
for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. Rv. 5, 6 (r995) (arguing that Smith rested on
an assessment of judicial (in)competence that Congress may not overturn); Eisgruber & Sager,
supra note 153, at 1309 (questioning RFRA's use of "a conceptual vocabulary that is abidingly
constitutional"); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 Mo Nr. L. REV. 171, 173 (r995) (terming RFRA "a challenge to the concept of

judicial supremacy in the interpretation of the Constitution").
162 See Lupu, supra note 161, at 173 (linking the question of Congress's affirmative power to
questions of federalism). As a restraint on the federal government, RFRA is less problematic. It
"is both a rule of interpretation for future [and past] federal legislation and an exercise of general
legislative supervision over federal agencies, enacted pursuant to each of the federal powers that
gives rise to legislation or agencies in the first place." Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas,
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV.

209, 211

(1994); see also

Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249, 253 (1995) ("Congress
possesses the same power to pass RFRA, as RFRA concerns federal statutes, as it had to pass
those other federal statutes in the first place."). Laycock is the most ardent defender of RFRA's
constitutionality in regard to the states as well. He argues that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to define constitutional guarantees more broadly than does the Court, so long
as Congress does not thereby contravene the Court's interpretation of other constitutional requirements. See Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 152-69
(1995).
163 See Conkle, supra note 157, at 61-70; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 153, at 1308.
164 See William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal
Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REv. 227, 228-29 (1995); cf. Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 153, at 1308 (suggesting that RFRA may violate the authors' understanding of

religious liberty, a principle which they term "equal regard").
165 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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avoid the floodgates problem of subjecting all incidental burdens on
16 6
religion to strict scrutiny, RFRA covers only "substantial" burdens.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of RFRA provides any
clear indication of how courts ought to determine whether an incidental burden on religion is in fact substantial. The House report accompanying RFRA does reveal an "expectation that the courts will look to
free exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in
167
determining whether or not religious exercise has been burdened."
RFRA does not, however, simply restore the pre-Smith law. The text
of RFRA specifies that its purpose is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in"168 two cases: Sherbert v. Verner169 and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 7 0 RFRA would thus seem to endorse a specific version
of the pre-Smith law, "the high-water mark of free exercise accommodation."' 7 1 Yet neither Sherbert nor Yoder gives a satisfactory explanation of the substantiality threshold of RFRA.
In Sherbert, South Carolina had denied unemployment compensa72
tion to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday.
In finding a free exercise violation, the Supreme Court did not use the
precise phrase "substantial burden"; instead, it analyzed the burden in
the following terms:
The ruling [of the South Carolina Supreme Court] forces [the claimant]
to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other. Governmental imposition
of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
173
worship.
This approach provides little guidance for the substantiality inquiry, as the following hypothetical example illustrates. Suppose that
See id. § 2ooobb(a)(3).
H.R. REP. No. 88, I03d Cong., ist Sess. 6-7 (i993). One of the lower courts that has
interpreted RFRA states that the substantiality requirement reflects the Supreme Court's preSmith jurisprudence. See Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F-3d 846, 849 (3d Cir. 1994). Unfortunately, however, the pre-Smith case law is hardly coherent or definitive. As Ira Lupu has
noted, interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause may be roughly divided into three historical
periods. See Lupu, supra note I61, at 176-77. Prior to 1878, the Free Exercise Clause was essentially unenforced by the judiciary. Then in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the
Court held that the Clause protects religious belief but not conduct. See id. at 166-67 (upholding
a prohibition on polygamy). The Court followed this approach until 1963, when it sustained a
free exercise challenge to an incidental burden in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
The Court purported to follow Sherbert's compelling interest test until Smith was decided but
typically ruled against the religious claimant. See Lupu, supra note 161, at 177.
168 42 U.S.C. § 2ooobb(b)(I).
169 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
166
167

170 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

171 Paulsen, supra note 162, at 256.
172 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-402.
173 Id. at 404.
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the only route that a churchgoer may feasibly use to travel to church
involves payment of a twenty-five-cent toll on a state-operated highway. Using the Sherbert analysis, the toll forces the individual to
choose between, on the one hand, following the precepts of her religion by going to church and forfeiting the twenty-five cents or, on the
other hand, abandoning the religious requirement of church attendance. Of course, forgoing unemployment benefits is a much greater
sacrifice than paying a quarter, but nothing in the Sherbert analysis
makes this fact significant. The Sherbert Court simply states that the
incidental burden at issue is the equivalent of a targeted burden that
would have the same impact; yet under this view, every incidental
burden would trigger strict scrutiny.
The other case cited in RFRA, Wisconsin v. Yoder, is equally unilluminating. In Yoder, members of the Amish faith claimed an exemption from a Wisconsin requirement that children be educated until the
age of sixteen.' 7 4 The Court held that the compulsory attendance law,
as applied to children born and raised in the Amish faith, threatened
to undermine severely the entire Amish faith,17 5 and thus applied strict
scrutiny. The question that Yoder does not answer, however, is how
burdensome a law must be before the burden will be deemed substantial enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
On this question, the post-Yoder, pre-Smith law is not especially
instructive. In two cases involving religious freedom claims by Native
Americans, the Court held that government administration of its land
or its internal programs imposed no burden on religion, even though
the challenged actions were, in the plaintiffs' view, perilous to their
spiritual well-being. 176 Even if RFRA would not disturb these results,

177

the cases do not provide any clear basis for a distinction be-

tween substantial and insubstantial burdens, because many
burdens that common sense would deem insubstantial will
to the government's own workings but instead will involve
ercive measures taken by the state. 178 The toll example
above is a case in point. 7 9 Perhaps this example could be
under an implicit de minimis exception to RFRA; such an

incidental
not relate
direct codiscussed
dismissed
exceptiop,

174 See Yoder, 4o6 U.S. at 209.
175 See id. at 218.
176 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988)
(finding strict scrutiny inapplicable to the government's proposed building of a road on sacred,
albeit government-owned, land); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 7o8-I2 (1986) (finding strict scrutiny inapplicable to the government's internal assignment of a social security number to a child).
177 The funding for the actual road at issue in Lyng was ultimately withdrawn and the road
relocated. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 153, at 1304 & n.xzS.
178 But see Thiry v. Carlson, 887 F. Supp. 1407, 1412-14 (D. Kan. 1995) (relying on Lyng to
find no substantial burden under RFRA when the state condemned land on which the owners'
stillborn daughter was buried and which they regularly visited to pray and to be near the child's
spirit).
179 See supra pp. 1212-13.
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however, gives little guidance for closer cases. In short, RFRA, its legislative history, and the pre-Smith case law leave the essential distinction between substantial and insubstantial burdens largely undefined.
Given this definitional void, courts might be tempted to analogize
incidental burdens on religion to those burdens falling on other rights,
especially speech. RFRA establishes a test roughly equivalent to the
one implicit in the Supreme Court's approach to incidental burdens on
speech. 180 Perhaps we can therefore utilize the concepts of free speech
jurisprudence that provide the basis for that test. Returning to the
example of the toll road to church, we might deem the burden insubstantial by relying on the facilitative/intertwined distinction sketched
above in section lI.A.' 8 ' Under this analysis, paying the toll facilitates
religious exercise but is not intertwined with it. Before extending this
approach, however, we should reconsider the practical and theoretical
difficulties of the facilitative/intertwined distinction in free speech
82
law.1
Moreover, in adapting a free speech test to free exercise jurisprudence, a problem immediately arises - the concept of an alternative
means of expression has no obvious free exercise analogue. As Kent
Greenawalt explains, a "person who acts from religious conscience
feels he has no alternative; a person expressing an idea wants to do so
effectively, but probably does not feel some inner compulsion to use a
particular means.' u8 3 For example, the law challenged in O'Brien
merely made it more difficult for O'Brien to communicate his anti-war
message as effectively as he liked, 8 4 whereas the law challenged in
Smith made it impossible for the Native Americans to engage in a
required religious ritual.' 85
180 See supra section HI.A.
181 See supra pp. 12o6-o8.
182 See supra pp. 12o6-og.
183 Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1992, at 5,27 (1992).

184 But see Williams, supra note 98, at 706 (arguing that in symbolic speech cases such as
O'Bien, there can never be an adequate alternative means of expression, presumably because the
medium is the message).
185 In the special context of prisoners' rights, in which the decisions of administrators are reviewed with minimal scrutiny, the Supreme Court has been less than sensitive to this distinction.
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Court upheld a prison regulation prohibiting inmate-

to-inmate mail correspondence between different prisons, in part because the prohibition left inmates with alternative means of expression. See id. at 92. Barely a week later, in O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (x987), the Court upheld the application of a prison schedule to
Islamic inmates that prevented them from attending Jumu'ab, their religiously required Friday
prayer services. See id. at 347, 353. Citing Safley, the Court noted that although there exist "no

alternative means of attending Jumu'ah," id. at 351, it was significant that the inmates retained
"the ability to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies," id. at 352. In Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328 (gth Cir. 19go), the Ninth Circuit, noting that inmates could "participate in
other aspects of their religion," applied Safley and O'Lone to uphold application of a prison regulation forbidding beards for Orthodox Jewish inmates. Id. at 332; see also Ward v. Walsh, i F.3d
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Can anything concrete be said about RFRA's substantiality threshold? Certainly, laws that have the incidental effect of rendering impossible the observation of a religious rite would constitute substantial
burdens under the Act. The same would be true of laws that have the
incidental effect of requiring the performance of a religiously proscribed act. These examples are easy cases, however. More difficult
are cases in which a generally applicable law increases the cost (either
monetary or other) of religious observation, but does not render it impossible. Ignoring incidental burdens that fall short of making a religious practice impossible or requiring a religiously proscribed act
would provide a bright-line rule, but would significantly weaken protection for religion. The law challenged in Sherbert did not render
Saturday worship impossible; it merely exacted a stiff monetary price
for observance. Yet RFRA quite clearly contemplates that the burden
in cases like Sherbert is substantial. The very concept of a substantiality test implies a subjective weighing process. Judicial inquiry under
a substantiality test must therefore be subjective if courts are to be
sensitive to different contexts. Even so, a few guiding principles can
be discerned.
First, to the extent possible, the substantiality inquiry should not
turn on the centrality or importance of the burdened practice to the
religion. To decide whether a particular practice is of central importance to a faith would require a religious judgment, which secular
courts are ill-equipped to render.'8 6 The threshold question ought to
be whether the claimant has a bona fide religious belief that she
187
should engage in the burdened practice.
873, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that O'Lone and Friedman survive Smith). RFRA includes
no express exception for the religious rights of prisoners and, thus, may provide greater protection
than O'Lone. See Conkle, supra note 157, at 72 & n.164 (noting that RFRA's legislative history
indicates an intent to overrule O'Lone); cf. Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568, 574-76 (S.D.N.Y.
z995) (applying RFRA strict scrutiny to Rastafarian prison guards' claim for an exemption from
prison regulations prohibiting dreadlocks).
186 See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (989) (holding
that a professed Christian's sincerely held religious objection to Sunday work was entitled to First
Amendment protection although he was not a member of any organized sect that forbade it); see
also Paulsen, supra note x62, at 249 ("Religious freedom claims ... require Government to sort
out bona fide free exercise of religion claims from false ones of simple resistance to bureaucracy
... without violating other constitutional principles forbidding Government discrimination among
religious beliefs or Government evaluation of the truth, worth, consistency, or plausibility of asserted religious beliefs.").
187 In emphasizing that courts should not assess the validity of a religious belief, the Supreme
Court has clearly implied that the threshold question must be the existence of a religious belief.
See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9 (1987) ("In applying the Free Exercise Clause, courts may not inquire into the truth, validity or reasonableness of
a claimant's religious beliefs." (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944))); Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-I6 (x981). On one view, RFRA's
legislative history shows an intent to apply strict scrutiny to substantially burdened conduct that
is "motivated" by, as opposed to "compelled" by religion. See Laycock & Thomas, supra note 162,
at 231-32 & n.I3I. As a matter of legislative intent, this may be correct, but I suspect that courts
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Second, in determining whether a generally applicable provision of
law substantially burdens a religious practice, the notion of alternative
means will be useful if applied flexibly rather than by strict analogy to
free speech cases. Consider for example, the statute at issue in Sherbert, which deemed persons unwilling to work on Saturday ineligible
for unemployment insurance benefits. Does it create a substantial burden? Courts' analysis might turn on whether the dismissed employees
have adequate alternative employment opportunities that would not
require Saturday work. If so, then if claimants do not avail themselves of these opportunities, the state may demonstrate voluntary unemployment without triggering heightened scrutiny under RFRA.
Here, courts would focus on claimants' choice of employers, a choice
that has no religious significance in itself.
Third, in some cases we may reduce the inevitable subjectivity of
the substantiality inquiry by applying the notion of neutrality, but
with greater sensitivity than the Smith Court itself did. As Michael
McConnell argues, the unemployment scheme in Sherbert is hardly
neutral, because it reflects the majority's religious preference for Sunday as a day of rest. 18 By asking whether the burden imposed by a
particular law on an adherent of a minority faith greatly exceeds the
law's effect on the majority - whose religious preferences the law
reflects - we can give the substantiality test some concrete substance.
Although courts may not be prepared to find outright discrimination in disproportionate burdens, the inequality of burdens could still
serve as a rough proxy for substantiality. To determine the substantiality of the burden that a law imposes on a religion, it will often be
useful to compare that burden with the law's effect on persons who do
not share the religion of the person challenging the law. In Braunfield
v. Brown,189 Orthodox Jews challenged a Sunday closing law, in part
because it burdened their right to observe the Saturday Sabbath by
requiring Jewish-owned stores to remain closed for two days rather
than one.' 9 0 In such a case, a court could examine the unequal character of the burden imposed by the challenged law rather than attempt
to conduct a detailed economic inquiry to determine the harm caused
to Orthodox Jewish businesses. It would be sufficient to note that the
combined impact of the legal and religious obligations on a Saturday

concerned about floodgate problems will nonetheless use a higher threshold, one that requires the
claimant to show that she felt some religious obligation, although not necessarily compulsion. The
test that I suggest in the text, which asks what the claimant believes that she "should" do, is
deliberately flexible on this point.
188 See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1133-36.

189 366 U.S. 599 (ig6i).
190 See id. at 6Oi. The Court upheld the Sunday closing law. See id. at 609.
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Sabbath observer is much more severe than the corresponding impact
on Sunday Sabbath observers and nonobservers. 191
The difficulty with this approach to RFRA is largely textual. In
legislatively overruling Smith, Congress did not expressly disturb the
Smith Court's largely formal conception of neutrality. Instead, Congress extended strict scrutiny to substantial burdens imposed by generally applicable laws without regard to the laws' comparative effects on
persons of different religions. Presumably, when a law qualifies as
neutral in the Smith sense but not in the more demanding sense that I
have described here, RFRA could still be interpreted to require a
threshold inquiry into how substantially the law burdens religion. Perhaps the courts will take a less textualist and more purposive approach to the RFRA, understanding it to reflect general congressional
disapproval of Smith and its conception of neutrality. Or perhaps the
Supreme Court will, as a constitutional matter, revisit the Smith
Court's view of neutrality quite apart from RFRA. 1 92
Barring either of these interpretive maneuvers, 9 3 courts will be
faced with the task of determining what burdens on religion are sub191 Cf. McConnell, supra note 14, at 1134-35 (noting that the laws prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic drugs but not alcohol reflect the fact that Christians and Jews use only the latter in
their religious rituals). Note, however, that the creation of an exemption for a Saturday Sabbath
observer may, under certain circumstances, place her in a better position than non-Saturday Sabbath observers. Cf. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 71o-II (i985) (finding an Establishment Clause violation when a state statute categorically prohibited employers from discharging
an employee for refusing to work on a day designated by the employee as his sabbath). For
example, assume that there are five shoe stores in a community with a mandatory Sunday closing
law. Four of the stores are owned by Sunday worshippers or nonreligious people. The fifth is
owned by an Orthodox Jew. Granting the Orthodox Jew an exemption from the Sunday closing
law has the effect of making his store the only store open on Sunday. The other four merchants
must divide the Saturday shoe business four ways, however. Although this may seem unfair, the
unfairness results primarily from the fact that the majority is permitted to enact a general law
requiring Sunday closing - not from the exemption. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
449 (ig6i) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a Sunday closing law). Absent the
Sunday closing law, the Saturday Sabbath observers would close their stores on Saturday, Sunday
Sabbath observers would close their stores on Sunday, and nonobservers would keep their stores
open or closed as they saw fit.
192 Cf. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 153, at 1297-98, 13o6-07 (disapproving of the RFRA
approach and advocating instead a principle of "equal regard," arguing that "[g]overnmental action that betrays a failure to treat the serious concerns of minority religious believers with the
same regard extended to the deep concerns of citizens generally is vulnerable to a distinct constitutional objection").
193 A reexamination of the concept of neutrality in religion cases seems unlikely in light of the
Court's recent willingness to find that, notwithstanding the Establishment Clause, the Free
Speech Clause does not permit exclusion of religious groups from various government programs,
because such programs provide mere incidental benefits to religion. See Rosenberger v. Rector of
Univ. of Va., 1i5 S. Ct. 2510, 2523-24 (1995) (requiring funding for production of sectarian student newspaper); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinnette, i15 S. Ct. 2440, 2447 (x995)
(requiring that a private group be permitted to place a Latin cross in a plaza next to the state
capitol); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (I993)
(requiring that a private group be permitted to show a religiously oriented film series in a public
school).
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stantial under RFRA. As in the free speech context, it will be difficult
to set forth with precision general criteria for making this determination, 9 4 which essentially amounts to one of fact-specific line95
drawing.
C. Incidental Burdens on the Unenumerated Right to Privacy
One of the most important constitutional decisions in recent years,
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 9 6 announces a standard for judging the
constitutionality of abortion regulations that closely mirrors the standard that I argue should (and largely does) apply to laws incidentally
burdening free speech and free exercise of religion. According to the
pivotal three-Justice opinion in Casey, a law that has "the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus" constitutes an undue (and therefore
unconstitutional) burden
on a woman's right to decide whether to
97
have an abortion.

194 In applying a substantiality threshold, the Eighth Circuit stated:
To show a free exercise violation, a religious adherent must initially prove the challenged
governmental action substantially burdens the adherent's religious practice.... [T]he burden must rise to the level of pressuring the adherent to commit an act the religion forbids,
or preventing the adherent from engaging in conduct that the faith requires.
Brown v. Polk County, 37 F-3d 404, 41o (8th Cir. 1994). This formulation does not include protection for acts that are merely motivated by - as opposed to compelled by - religion. However, as to acts compelled by religion, the court does not provide any additional guidance,
deferring to the district court's discretion in making factual findings. The question remains: how
much pressure must the governmental action place on the religious adherent? Note also that in
Polk County the challenged action - an order that a government employee stop proselytizing and
remove religious symbols from work - was targeted at religion. See id. at 407. Nonetheless, the
court applied a substantiality threshold, although it did not rely on or even mention RFRA. In
contrast, the Third Circuit - which did invoke RFRA - has held that the Act's substantiality
threshold does not apply to targeted burdens. See Brown v. Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3rd
Cir. 1994).
195 In Rosenberger, Justice Souter observed in dissent that no one argues that all incidental
benefits would be Establishment Clause violations:
Would it be wrong to put out fires in burning churches, wrong to pay the bus fares of
students on the way to parochial schools, wrong to allow a grantee of special education
funds to spend them at a religious college? These are the questions that call for drawing

lines ....
Rosenberger, H5 S. Ct. at 2541 (Souter, J., dissenting).
196 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

197 Id. at 877 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (emphasis added). The undue burden standard is binding on lower courts, see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (defining the holding of a divided Court as the view of the members of the Court who
concurred on the narrowest grounds), although for stare decisis purposes, only the portion of the
three-Justice opinion that garnered five votes counts as a full-fledged precedent in the Supreme
Court itself, see Michael C. Dorf, Predictionand the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 684-85
(1995). At least for the short term, however, lower courts must muddle through with the undue
burden test, because the Supreme Court appears to be uninterested in granting review to flesh out
the standard's meaning. See, e.g., Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir.) (upholding
a restrictive abortion statute post-Casey), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 468 (1993).
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Here we see a standard that appears to work in a familiar fashion.
A court will invalidate a generally valid law as applied to abortion or
to some women seeking abortions, but only if the law imposes a substantial burden on the abortion right. 198 Yet the Casey test states that
the substantiality threshold applies to laws with the purpose or effect
of burdening a right; Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter do not
distinguish between direct and incidental burdens.
Casey was not the first unenumerated rights case to employ a substantiality threshold for all burdens. 199 In Zablocki v. Redhail,20 0 for
example, the Supreme Court sustained a challenge to a Wisconsin statute that required a noncustodial parent under a duty of child support
to obtain a court's permission to marry.20 1 The Court began its analysis by recognizing that marriage is a fundamental right. 20 2 The Court
went on to state that this principle did not render all regulations of
marriage suspect:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do
not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way
to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to
rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship
20 3
may legitimately be imposed.

This language closely parallels that of the undue burden standard of
Casey.20 4 Therefore, the Casey standard is not anomalous in the
20 5
Court's privacy doctrine.
198 In one respect, this standard is more strict even than the standard under RFRA. A substantial burden on religion may be upheld under RFRA if it survives strict scrutiny. Under the
Casey approach, however, a substantial burden is, ipso facto, unconstitutional. See Casey, 5
U.S. at 877 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). This result appears to follow
from the Court's view that the only arguably compelling government interest in the previability
abortion context - the life or potential life of a fetus - is insufficient to overcome a woman's
right to choose. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 4o U.S. 113, x63-64 (1973) (describing viability as the stage of
development at which the state interest in fetal life becomes compelling). Whether some other
state interest might justify prohibiting previability abortions is a question unlikely to arise, because the Court has already held that the other interest typically at stake - the woman's health
does not justify abortion prohibitions at that stage. See id. at 163.
199 See generally Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden
Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HAsTINGS LJ. 867, 872 (1994) (arguing that the undue
burden standard of Casey is broadly consistent with the Supreme Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence in a wide range of cases).
200 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
201 See id. at 390-91.
202 See id. at 383-86. The Court deemed marriage a fundamental right for equal protection
purposes, but it relied on substantive due process cases. See id. at 384.
203 Id. at 386 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)).
204 See Brownstein, supra note i99, at 895-96 (describing Zablocki as an antecedent of Casey).
205 Moreover, since Casey, at least one district court has applied the undue burden standard to
invalidate regulations burdening a different unenumerated right protected under the rubric of a
right of privacy the asserted right to physician-assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 85o F. Supp. 1454, 1459-61 (W.D. Wash. 1994), affd, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL 94848,
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The doctrinal approach to privacy rights thus appears to differ significantly from the approach to free speech and (statutory) free exercise. In contrast to the latter two areas, it seems that both incidental
and direct burdens on privacy rights must be substantial before courts
will subject them to heightened scrutiny. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this section, I argue that the conception of incidental burdens
underlying the joint opinion in Casey shares significant features with
the conception of incidental burdens on free speech and free exercise,
and that understanding Casey will illuminate the general problem of
incidental burdens.
Casey does not at first appear to be a case about incidental burdens at all, because the challenged Pennsylvania statute directly
targeted abortion, and only abortion, for regulation. Without invoking
incidental burdens, however, it is nearly impossible to make sense of
206
significant portions of the pivotal joint opinion.
In explaining the undue burden standard, the authors of the Casey
joint opinion termed regulations falling short of the substantiality
threshold "incidental" burdens. 20 7 The terminology is confusing. The
opposite of a substantial burden is an insubstantial burden, not an incidental one. An incidental effect may constitute a substantial burden
- for example, a law requiring the concurrence of two doctors before
any surgery is performed may not target abortion but does make obtaining an abortion extremely difficult in regions where doctors who
perform abortions are scarce.2 0 8 Conversely, a direct burden may be
insubstantial - for example, a one-penny tax on abortions but not
other medical procedures.2 0 9 Why then, does the joint opinion refer to
less-than-substantial burdens as incidental? Is there any sense in
which a law that imposes requirements on women who wish to obtain
abortions but not other medical services constitutes only an incidental
restriction on the abortion right?
at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc). In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel suggested
that recent Supreme Court doctrine appears to be moving towards a "balancing test" for all infringements of fundamental rights. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, 1996 WL
94848, at *xi(gth Cir. Mar. 6, 1996) (en banc). But cf. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714,
724-33 (Mich. 1994) (finding no right to assisted suicide), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (I995).

206 See Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey
in ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2031-38 (I994) (discussing ambiguities
in the Casey joint opinion's description and use of the undue burden test); cf. Brownstein, supra

note 199, at 927-28 (arguing that the Casey joint opinion does not adequately justify the particular version of the undue burden test that it adopts).
207 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, So5 U.S. 833, 843 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor,

Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
208 See Dorf, supra note i, at 275 (arguing that such a "Second Opinion Act" might survive a
facial attack but could be vulnerable to an as-applied challenge in the case of abortion).
209 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 988 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that the burdens that the Pennsylvania law placed on abortion were all directed at
abortion and were therefore not incidental constraints); Dorf, supra note i, at 275 n.176 (agreeing
with Justice Scalia's characterization).
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We can begin to answer this question by identifying the value of
the right to decide whether to have an abortion from the perspective
of the rightholder. A pregnant woman seeking an abortion has two
principal interests: an interest in not becoming a parent, and an interest in not undergoing the physical privations of pregnancy and childbirth. 210 On virtually no account of abortion rights does a woman
claim an interest in killing a fetus simply for the sake of killing.2 11
However, a pregnant woman's decision to end her pregnancy prior to
viability will inevitably have the collateral effect of killing a fetus.
The state's principal interest, on the other hand, is to protect the
potentiality of human life, according to the theory of Roe v. Wade 2 12
and Casey. The state does not directly target the two interests of
abortion-seeking women. For the state to preserve fetal life, however,
it must impose an incidental burden on the woman's interests in
avoiding parenthood and the continuation of her pregnancy - incidental because the state would theoretically permit her to terminate
her pregnancy before gestation became complete were that consistent
with preserving fetal life.
The difficulty with this double-faceted view of interests is that, if
applied generally, it would convert nearly all direct regulations of
rights into incidental burdens, because typically, what renders the exercise of a right offensive to the majority has little to do with what
renders the right valuable to the rightholder. Consider, for example,
the rule prohibiting "First Amendment activities" in the Los Angeles
airport, which was invalidated in Board of Airport Commissioners v.
Jews for Jesus, Inc. 21 3 The airport authorities were concerned about

the disruptive potential of "nonairport-related speech." 2 14 The persons
challenging the law, however, did not wish to speak for the purpose 2of
15
disrupting airport activities. Rather, they wished to communicate.
The airport authorities might have argued that their interest in avoiding a disruption of airport activities imposed only an incidental burden
on the rights of speakers. Yet such an argument, if accepted, would
210 The Casey majority recognized both interests by locating the abortion right at the crossroads of cases involving intimate associations and cases involving bodily integrity. See Casey, 5o5
U.S. at 8S7. Note that a pregnant woman also could be said to have a third interest - that of
decisional autonomy or privacy. But an interest defined at such a general level is typically contentless. See TRIBE, supra note 5, § 15-1, at 1303.

211 Of course, from the perspective of an abortion opponent, this is precisely what the pregnant
woman claims. But this is hardly what justifies the right from the perspective of the woman
seeking an abortion. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
120 (1988) ("Some people sincerely regard . . . abortions . . . as murders; others see them as
exercises of a fundamental human right. The level of mutual understanding is very low ....
212 41o U.S. 113 (1973).

1.

213 482 U.S. 569 (1987).

214 Id. at 576.
21S The plaintiff was a religious organization that sought to distribute leaflets within an airport
terminal. See id. at 571.
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nearly eviscerate judicial protection of rights, because it is usually possible to characterize the harm that a right's exercise causes in a way
that does not target the right's value from the perspective of the
rightholder.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has sometimes accepted a more
limited version of this argument. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,216 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited theaters from showing nonobscene films that emphasized specific sexual
activities or anatomical areas.2 17 Despite the ordinance's facial use of
expressive content as the trigger for regulation, the Court characterized the ordinance as content-neutral because it was justified not by
hostility to the content of the restricted films, but by the "secondary
effects" of adult theaters on the community - increased prostitution
and other illegal conduct. 2 18 The Court has not always confined this
conception of content-based regulation to low-value speech, but has
sometimes incorporated it into more general free speech jurisprudence.2 1 9 Indeed, the Court often defines a content-neutral regulation
220
of speech as one that is justified in terms of communicative impact,
and thereby prescribes a double-faceted view of interests similar to
that used in Casey.
The parallel between the Renton conception of content-neutral regulations and Casey's premise that some laws targeting abortion nonetheless pose only an incidental burden is not perfect. First, under the
Court's free speech jurisprudence, even a content-neutral regulation of
speech such as the ordinance in Renton must satisfy the O'Brien
test.22 1 Under Casey, in contrast, an incidental burden that is not a
substantial obstacle need only be reasonable, 22 2 which is presumably a
2 23
lower standard.
More importantly, the relation in Renton of the secondary effects
of adult films to the messages of those films differs from the relation
in Casey of the state's interest to the woman's interest. In the Renton
context, real situations exist in which the secondary effects do not ac216 475 U.S. 4 (t986).

217 See id. at 44.
218 See idl. at 47-48.
219 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.

312, 320-21

(x988) (approving the Renton test of content-

neutral speech in the context of political speech but finding it inapplicable to the ordinance in
question).
220

See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

221

See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48.

See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, SoS U.S. 833, 872-74, 883 (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); see also Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 614-15 (lith Cir.
1995) (relying on Zablocki and applying rational basis scrutiny to municipal anti-nepotism policy
because it "does not directly and substantially interfere with the fundamental right to marry").
223 According to one commentator, Casey thus adopts a two-tier approach for abortion regulations, whereas free speech doctrine employs a three-tier approach. See Brownstein, supra note
222

199, at 926.
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company the films. 224 In contrast, a woman claiming a right to an
abortion challenges the state's view that its interest in preserving fetal
life can be described apart from - and in opposition to - her interests. In practical terms, if an abortion regulation based on the state's
asserted interest in preserving fetal life imposes only an incidental burden on the woman's rights to avoid continuing pregnancy, childbirth,
and parenthood, then even an outright ban on abortions would impose
only an incidental burden, so long as the ban is justified by an interest
in fetal life. But then all burdens engendered by abortion regulations
would be incidental, a position clearly at odds with the Casey plurality's approach.
Is there a meaningful sense in which abortion restrictions do not
have the purpose of making the abortion right more difficult to exercise? If one looks not so much to the underlying basis for the abortion

right but to its content, then we may find the beginnings of an explanation. According to the Casey joint opinion, the right recognized by

Roe is a "right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing So. "1225 Under this view, a twenty-fourhour waiting period during which a woman may consult others and
reflect on the information that the state has required her to consider
does not regulate the ultimate decision, even though it obviously

targets the decisional process. Such a regulation facilitates what the

224 I do not wish to endorse the application of the Renton approach in cases such as Renton
itself. If the "secondary effects" that concern the government derive from the communicative impact of speech, then the test has the potential to swallow free speech law whole. See supra pp.
1222-23. A slightly less problematic version of the secondary effects rationale appears in Justice
Souter's opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 5ox U.S. 56o, 581-87 (ggi) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment), in which the majority upheld a prohibition on public nudity as applied to
nude dancing, see Barnes, 5o U.S. at 563. He suggested that secondary effects are only
secondary if they are not mediated by the communicative impact of the expressive conduct. According to Justice Souter, the state is entitled to conclude that the people who come to watch
nude dancing are either more inclined to commit sexual assault and to patronize prostitutes than
other members of the public, or are spurred to crime by the viewing of nude bodies, quite apart
from any message that they receive from the nude dancing. See id. at 585-86 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). But see Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment: The Revealing Case of Nude Dancing, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 611, 654-55 (1992) (noting
Justice Souter's failure to provide any empirical evidence for these propositions). Assuming that
Justice Souter's hypothesis is factually correct and assuming that one can distinguish between
effects associated with speech and effects caused by speech, Justice Souter's version of the secondary effects rationale is less sweeping than the Renton formulation appears to be.
In any event, outside the context of low-value speech cases, the Court has tended to disregard
the Renton and Ward definition of content-neutrality in recent years, instead reaffirming the view
that "illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment."
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994) (quoting Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (i991) (quoting Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (x983))) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Bhagwat, supra note 113, at 161-62.
225 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
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state perceives to be informed decisionmaking, and is therefore consis2 26
tent with the woman's right to make the ultimate decision.
To some, calling the twenty-four-hour waiting period a measure
that facilitates the abortion decision may seem Orwellian, because in
many cases the waiting period operates to frustrate that decision by
rendering more costly and time-consuming the process for obtaining an
abortion by a woman who has already made her decision. The Casey
joint opinion authors might respond that, because the abortion decision is irreversible, measures that induce informed and careful thought
are needed to facilitate decisions that will not lead to later regret. But
this response seems inadequate. If the state's true concern is irreversibility, why not enact a general law governing all irreversible medical
decisions? 227 There must be some reason to believe that the substance
of a particular irreversible decision carries special risks. In the abortion context, it may be that the state deems the destruction of a fetus
sufficiently harmful to justify the added deliberation. But then does
this rationale directly undermine the abortion right itself?
Perhaps the state may invoke the reasons for recognizing a right to
abortion in the first place. Some rights are protected because they are
important to the individuals who exercise them as well as to society
generally. Free speech is an example of such a right. Although many
persons will use their right of free speech to the net detriment of society, most defenders of the right will agree that, in the aggregate, society is better off when there is a robust marketplace of ideas. In
contrast, many supporters of privacy rights may believe that acts such
as abortion -

and, for that matter, suicide -

are almost always re-

grettable, but that, nonetheless, society as a whole should not have the
power to use government to dictate whether an abortion may or may
not be performed in a particular case. This does not mean, however,
that the state may not discourage the protected, though disapproved
act. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, there are valid reasons why government may "aim that its citizens treat decisions about human life and
death as matters of serious moral importance, 228 and thus that "[lt is
perfectly consistent to insist that states have no power to impose on
their citizens a particular view of how and why life is sacred, and yet

226 See id. at 872 ("[T]he State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage [a
woman] to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be
brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy . . . .
227 Indeed, why stop at medical decisions? All decisions are, in some sense, irreversible. For
example, the decision to burn an American flag in public as an act of political expression will
affect the flag burner's standing in the community in ways that probably can never be undone.
Yet this would not be a sufficient basis for imposing a 24-hour waiting period on persons who
desire to burn a flag.
228 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION I51 (993).
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also to insist that states do have the power to encourage their citizens
229
to treat the question of abortion seriously."

The Court appears to be receptive to a variety of arguments aimed
at showing that regulations that fall short of prohibition do not count
as purposeful infringements of the abortion right, because given the
way that the right is conceptualized, the regulatory purpose is not to
frustrate the exercise of the right - even if that result is the effect in
some set of cases. This approach may be generalized beyond abortion.
Consider the right to marry at issue in Zablocki and Loving v. Virginia.230 We might conceptualize the right to marry as a right of a
couple to have their relationship receive legal recognition upon satisfying reasonable, facilitative, state-imposed regulations. On this conception, a state law requiring a blood test or a nominal registration fee
would impose only an incidental burden on the right to marry, because that right, by definition, would only protect against nonfacilitative burdens. 23 1 Some laws targeting marriage, and only marriage,
could thus be termed incidental on such a definition.
Casey and Zablocki thus suggest that a constitutional right to do x
sometimes means a right to do x free of some, but not all, kinds of
burdens on x. In the case of abortion, we would say that the right to
an abortion means a right to an abortion free from some kinds of burdens, but not free from reasonable health measures or measures
designed "to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion."232

In general, therefore, some rights could presuppose

the

existence of conditions such that a regulation that appears to burden a
right could actually be consistent with the assumptions that define the
right.
Yet this approach resembles the conception of rights that I discussed and rejected in Part I. I noted there that it is possible to rig
the definition of rights so that incidental burdens do not constitute
infringements. By redefining a right to do x as a right not to be burdened by a law specifically penalizing the doing of x, one could make
the incidental burden problem go away by definitional fiat. Similarly,
it might seem that by redefining a right to do x as a right not to be
burdened by some particular class of restrictions on the right to do x,
229 Id. at x53; see also WEINREB, supra note 78, at 97 ("Rights . . . make us fit for moral
judgment; they do not guarantee that we shall act morally.").
230 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court invalidated Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute on two alternative grounds: that it utilized a racial classification, see id. at 7-12; and, that it unconstitutionally burdened the fundamental right to marry, see id. at 12.
231 When applied to an indigent couple, a registration fee might nonetheless be an unconstitutional burden. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (197i) (invalidating a statute levying
court fees against an indigent couple seeking a divorce because the fee deprived them of an opportunity to be heard in court).
232 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy &
Souter, JJ.).
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we have simply defined away our difficulties for those restrictions not
listed in the definition of x.
This criticism has some validity, but it does not render all definitional gambits illegitimate. Indeed, unless we are willing to begin with
the proposition that people have a general right to do whatever they
want, we will need some way to draw boundary lines in defining the
scope of the particular rights protected.
To some extent, the boundary will reflect a judgment about the
scope of the rightholder's interest. For example, obscenity does not
receive First Amendment protection because of a judgment that obscenity does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas or to human
self-expression (of the appropriate sort) in the same way that other
kinds of speech do. 23 3 In other instances, the right's boundary will

more clearly reflect the strength of the state's countervailing interest.234 To say, for example, that the right to free speech ends at the
point when a breach of the peace is imminent 23 5 is simply another
way of saying that regulations of this category of speech are
permissible.
The two classifications - rights whose boundaries are defined in
terms of the rightholder's interests and rights whose boundaries are
defined in terms of the state's countervailing interests - are not always cleanly separable. One might favor regulation of obscenity (or
pornography) on the view that the benefits that its consumers derive
are outweighed by the concrete harm that it causes to others or the
moral harm that it inflicts on the consumers themselves. Conversely,
one might take the view that speech that constitutes incitement serves
none of the values conventionally associated with the First Amendment. Similarly, the right to choose to terminate- a pregnancy (for reasons other than health) ends at fetal viability both because of the
increased state interest in a viable fetus and because of a decreased
individual interest on the part of a woman who has waited a long
period before deciding to abort.2 36 Internal and external limits often

coexist.
233 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (i957) (finding obscenity to be "utterly without redeeming social importance').
234 See generally WEINREB, supra note 78, at 74-IGO (arguing that the outer boundaries of
rights and responsibilities are defined with reference to each other). Even if we do not allow for
reasonable restrictions within the definition of a right, such allowance will inevitably be made
when we scrutinize infringements of the right. See Brownstein, supra note i99, at 871 C'[O]ften
the Court does not isolate the issue of infringement, but rather implicitly subsumes it within an
analysis that focuses on the scope of the right and the state's justification for any purported
impairment").
235 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
236 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (reaffirming
the viability line both because of the stage of fetal development and because "it might be said
that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf
of the developing child").
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Casey thus illustrates that the classification of a burden as incidental or direct depends in significant part not only on the nature of the
burden, but also on the scope of the right, which in turn depends upon
the reasons for recognizing the right and for establishing its stopping
point. As the First Amendment analogies illustrate, this point has po2 37
tential applicability to all primary conduct rights.
This section has thus far addressed two privacy rights: the right to
marriage and the right to abortion. Throughout, I have implicitly assumed that the proper approach to incidental burdens on these rights
will also be the proper approach to incidental burdens on other privacy rights. Without exhaustively cataloguing and analyzing all privacy rights, I close this section by sketching the reasons for my
assumption and suggesting some of its limitations.
Although the Supreme Court sometimes eschews expressly characterizing particular unenumerated rights as specific manifestations of a
more general right to privacy,2 38 in other cases its rhetoric reveals an
underlying commitment to certain unifying themes. For example, in
Casey, the opinion for the Court reaffirmed the practice of recognizing
unenumerated rights in the following terms:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education ....
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State. 239
The Court quite clearly located the abortion right within a constellation of what it termed "personal" choices. This suggests that the
Court envisioned a zone of personal freedom linking a variety of
rights. These rights are valuable because they protect important interests of the rightholder. Although the Casey Court described the privacy right as a right to make decisions free of compulsion by the state,
the Court did not mean that government intrusion into the private
realm is an evil in itself. Instead, government intrusion must be
avoided in order to preserve the individual's right to define herself
237 Of course, in Casey itself, the classification of a burden as incidental played no essential
role in the Court's decision, given its declaration that the same standard applies to laws with
either the purpose or the effect of burdening the abortion right. In the next Part, I consider
whether this unitary standard is justifiable; I locate incidental burdens within the larger context
of questions about how rights are infringed.
238 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. x86, i9o (x986) (describing the subject matter of
unenumerated-rights cases in narrow terms).
239 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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autonomously - a right of independent value. Indeed, according to
the Court, what makes privacy rights valuable is the very fact that the
individual herself chooses how to exercise them.
Thus, the Casey Court's justification of privacy rights fits comfortably within the conception of primary conduct rights that I described
in Part I above. In the images of the Anti-Federalists, the Constitution erects walls or barriers to prevent government intrusion into the
private sphere.2 40 In normative terms, private decisionmaking trumps
most government programs either as a matter of deontological right or
as a result of a consequentialist assessment that persons should be free
24
to pursue their own conception of the good life. As we saw above, '
either basis for protecting a realm of right leads naturally to the conclusion that incidental burdens can undermine the right.
Of course, we should not take the Casey Court's understanding of
the privacy right as definitive. It may be possible to defend the privacy right in terms that focus more clearly on impermissible government action rather than on impermissible burdens on individuals. For
example, in striking down a ban on contraceptive use as applied to
married couples, the seminal modern privacy case, Griswold v. Connecticut,24 2 suggests a rationale based on the limits of government
power. 243 The Court asks rhetorically: "Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the
use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. 24 4
However, a government-centered justification of the privacy right
is problematic. What renders the governmental intrusion into the marital bedroom repulsive is the underlying judgment that contraceptive
use is a private matter. Were the government searching for evidence
of an activity that it could lawfully prohibit, such as child abuse, the
marital bedroom would not shield the wrongdoer against a police of245
ficer with a valid search warrant.
To put the point another way, attempts to root the privacy right in
the limits of government power seem ultimately to rest upon some
conception of the value of privacy to individuals. In this respect, consider Jed Rubenfeld's creative suggestion that the right of privacy protects against "a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism.

'246

The

right of privacy shields us against "a society standardized and normal240 See supra p. xx88.
241 See supra pp. 1194-99.
242 38x U.S. 479 (i965).
243 See id. at 481, 486.
244 Id. at 48546.
245 But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (i969) (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits prosecution for private home possession of legally obscene material).
246 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989).
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24 7
ized, in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly directed."
Rubenfeld thus would appear to justify the privacy right by reference
to a negative or anti-totalitarian vision of the state rather than an affirmative vision of the individual.
Careful examination of Rubenfeld's thesis, however, reveals that it
too rests on an affirmative conception of rights that serve individuals'
interests. Rubenfeld contends that the Court's privacy decisions do
not protect persons in engaging in particular acts or making particular
decisions so much as the right of privacy prevents the state from forcing persons into prescribed life patterns. 248 For example, "[a]nti-abortion laws produce motherhood" and thereby require women to play the
role of mother.24 9 Such laws are "totalitarian" in the sense that they
shape the totality of a person's life.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Rubenfeld's justification of the privacy right in "anti-totalitarian" terms is correct. Even
so, his account rests on a vision of rights that derive their value from
the rightholder's individual interest in rights - a point somewhat obscured by Rubenfeld's confusing use of the term "totalitarian." The
"total" in totalitarian ordinarily refers to the aspects of society controlled by the state. Thus, although a state that prohibits abortion
may be unjust, if it is a multi-party democracy that respects other civil
liberties, we would not term the state totalitarian. By conjuring up for
us the image of a state that controls all aspects of human life,
Rubenfeld elides the question of what particular aspects of human life
the state should be permitted to regulate or even to control.
This question cannot be answered without some conception of
what is valuable to the individual - whether we describe value in the
conventional terms of what an individual wishes to do or, as
Rubenfeld would, in terms of what she wishes to avoid. In concrete
terms, how are we to know that a law prohibiting bakery employment
for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week 250 does not
unacceptably force a person who is subject to the law into a total life
pattern - that of a worker with leisure time? The answer can only
be a value judgment that avoidance of this kind of life pattern does
not warrant special constitutional solicitude. In more conventional
terms, modern privacy law assumes that some freedoms have more
value to individuals than others.2 5 '
In short, the right of privacy protects various freedoms because individuals value them. Deciding which freedoms to protect and de-

247 Id.

248 See id. at 783-84.
249 Id. at 788.
250 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (x9o5) (invalidating such a law as an unreasonable interference with the liberty of contract protected by the 14th Amendment).
251 See TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 55, at 66.
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lineating the scope of those freedoms will often call for difficult
judgments; yet whatever lines courts draw, the manner in which government actions infringe different privacy rights will exhibit broad
similarities because these rights receive recognition for broadly similar
reasons. Thus, it is sensible that the same basic framework for assessing incidental burdens apply to all privacy rights. To test this claim,
let us consider another privacy case.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,252 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a housing ordinance that forbade persons who were not
members of the same family from sharing a dwelling unit, and excluded from the definition of "family" a unit comprising two first cousins and their grandmother. Relying on the privacy line of cases,
Justice Powell, writing for a plurality, observed that East Cleveland's
decision "to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing deeply
into the family itself" is "no mere incidental result of the ordinance." 25 3
Suppose, however, that a law did impose a mere incidental burden on
the right of a self-defined family unit to live together. For concreteness, imagine that a husband, wife, and two minor children wish to
live in a section of a city that the municipality has zoned for commercial use only. The law imposes an incidental burden on their familycohabitation right under Moore. How should the incidental burden be
addressed?
Under my analysis of Casey's approach to incidental burdens, the
city need not satisfy heightened scrutiny unless the law substantially
burdens the family's right. Do zoning laws have this effect? As a general matter, it is unlikely that any zoning law would have as severe an
impact as the law in Moore did. There, the city forbade Ms. Moore
254
and her grandchildren from living together anywhere in the city.

Still, we can imagine circumstances in which the commercial zoning
law would impose a substantial burden. For example, if there is a
critical housing shortage in the city, then converting a residential zone
to a commercial zone could have the incidental - and substantial effect of forcing the family outside the city. It would not seem especially inappropriate to require the city to come forward with some
good reason for taking an action with such consequences.
Of course, the sympathy that we feel for the uprooted family in the
above hypothetical case may not be connected to a violation of its
rights under Moore. We would probably be no less sympathetic to an
individual who is zoned out of his home or to a group of unrelated
persons who are zoned out of their collective home. Yet Moore expressly distinguished the case of unrelated persons. 25 5 Should we
252 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

2S3 Id. at 498 (plurality opinion).
2S4 See id. at 495--96.
25S See id. (distinguishing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
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therefore conclude that the incidental burden framework described
above does not apply to the Moore group right? That conclusion
would be premature, but to avoid it we must, as always, be very clear
about the scope of the right at issue.
In the case of the unrelated persons zoned out of their home,
Moore suggests that they receive no special constitutional solicitude as
a group. But that is a far different thing from saying that they are not
entitled to protection as individuals. If the law in Moore had entirely
prohibited Ms. Moore from living anywhere in the city, regardless
whether she lived alone, with family members, or with unrelated persons, she might have claimed a violation of a right to dwell somewhere
in the city. We might infer that right from the fact that East Cleveland did not defeat Ms. Moore's actual claim by arguing that she
could live with her grandchildren outside the city.
In the alternative, we might prefer to view Moore as a disguised
equal protection case. Perhaps there is no right to live in any particular city, but a city policy that permits cohabitation by some kinds of
family groups and excludes cohabitation by others must satisfy strict
scrutiny. This would be a plausible explanation of the result in
Moore, although not the explanation that the Court gave. Reconceptualizing Moore as an equal protection case, however, would seem to
suggest that it does not protect a right to primary conduct, and thus
the approach to incidental burdens described above would not necessarily apply.
On the assumption that Moore does recognize a substantive right
to live with family members, application of the general incidental burden framework advanced in this article is sensible. As a specific manifestation of the general right to privacy, the right to live with family
members is recognized because it has great value to the rightholder. A
law imposing an incidental burden on the right, if substantial, may
deprive her of the right. Thus, subjecting such a law to heightened
scrutiny is an appropriate response.
The case for universalizing from the discussion of incidental burdens on the rights to abortion and to marriage is reasonably strong.
As a general matter, incidental burdens on privacy rights infringe important interests of rightholders. In the specific case of Moore, we see
that the general proposition holds, but we also derive a cautionary
note: in order to understand how to respond to an incidental burden,
courts must not only be precise about the nature of the burden, but
also about the nature of the right.
III.

IMPLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Although riddled with inconsistencies and exceptions, existing law
in the areas of free speech, (statutory) free exercise of religion, and
privacy appears to recognize that an incidental burden on a primary
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conduct right triggers some form of heightened scrutiny if, but only if,
the burden is substantial. In the course of describing this doctrine, I
have argued that the substantiality requirement is a sensible response
to competing concerns: on the one hand, the best understanding of
constitutional text, history, structure, and purpose suggests that incidental burdens matter; on the other hand, for government to function
effectively, most incidental burdens must be deemed inoffensive. The
substantiality requirement mediates this conflict.
In this final section, I address four questions raised by the discussion above. First, why not require that all burdens on fundamental
rights - whether direct or incidental - rise to the level of substantiality before applying heightened scrutiny? Second, what does the approach to incidental burdens described above imply for the treatment
of facial and as-applied challenges to assertedly unconstitutional laws?
Third, what difficulties can we expect to encounter in trying to determine what constitutes a substantial burden? Fourth, how can we apply the framework developed for analyzing incidental burdens on
primary conduct rights to other types of rights?
A.

Application of the Substantiality Threshold to
Targeted Burdens

The joint opinion from Planned Parenthood v. Casey256 quite
clearly states that a law having either the purpose or the effect of
erecting a substantial obstacle to a woman's decision whether to have
an abortion is unconstitutional. 25 7 By implication, a law with the purpose of erecting a minor obstacle to the abortion decision would survive the undue burden test. In other words, the Casey joint opinion
implies that the substantiality threshold applies not only to incidental,
but to direct burdens as well. Is this approach merely sloppy language
on the part of the three authors, or does it reflect some underlying
2 58
jurisprudential insight?
The short answer is a little of each. Plainly, the joint opinion cannot mean that laws having as their principal purpose the frustration of
a constitutional right without serving some other substantial interest
will be upheld so long as the government's tools only include rela-

256 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
257 See id. at 877-78 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
258 Perhaps the suggestion that the substantiality threshold applies even to purposeful burdens
reflects the joint opinion authors' uneasiness about recognizing unenumerated rights at all. This
explanation seems unlikely, however, because the portion of the joint opinion that commanded
five votes ringingly endorses the recognition of such rights. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-52. Moreover, permitting de minimis but not substantial purposeful burdens is a rather irrational means of
narrowing the scope of the abortion right because most efforts to limit abortion will only succeed
if they impose substantial burdens.
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tively minor obstacles.2s 9 As the Third Circuit explained in holding
that the substantiality threshold of RFRA does not apply to laws that
purposefully disadvantage religious practice:
The rare cases which address acts or laws which target religious activity
have never limited liability to instances where a "substantial burden" was
proved by the plaintiff. Applying such a burden test to non-neutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions
and exercise immune from the protection of the First Amendment. A

burden test is only necessary to place logical limits on free exercise rights
in relation to laws or actions designed to achieve legitimate, secular pur-

poses. Because government actions intentionally discriminating against
religious exercise afortiori serve no legitimate purpose, no balancing test
2 60
is necessary to cabin religious exercise in deference to such actions.

Generalizing this approach beyond religion claims, we might say that
if the apparent purpose of a law is to frustrate the exercise of a right,
2 61
that alone should be sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.

Of course courts, including the Supreme Court, are understandably
reluctant to invalidate a law that could, in principle, serve a valid pur-

pose on the ground that it actually was enacted for an illegitimate rea-

son.2 62 Laws often serve more than one purpose, and in any event, the

purpose of a law enacted by a multi-member body may be indeterminate. For this reason, an inquiry into purpose will typically be "objec-

tive" in the sense that courts seek to determine what justifications
could reasonably underlie a law, rather than what purposes in fact

263
motivated the relevant government actors.
Moreover, I am not suggesting that courts should scrutinize all
laws prescribing general rules of conduct for an underlying illicit purpose. One examines purpose in the hope of saving a law that is
targeted at protected conduct, not in the hope of invalidating a law
259 Cf id. at gig n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
targeted regulation of fundamental rights is permissible but "must be predicated on legitimate
state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the individual has made" (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (iggo) (opinion of Stevens, J.)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
260 Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 849-50 (3rd Cir. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
261 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 206, at 2078-79 (arguing that laws that have the purpose of
impeding access to abortion ought to be invalid per se).
262 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
382-86 (1968). But see Miller v. Johnson, iiS S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (gg)
(concluding that, in order
to prevail on an equal protection challenge'to a voting district, "plaintiff's burden is to show,
either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district");
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-89 (1987) (holding Louisiana's "Creationism Act" violative of the Establishment Clause because it lacked a clear secular purpose).
263 Cf Pildes, supra note 32, at 729 n45 (arguing that the literature exploring the indeterminacy of legislative purpose in constitutional law often mistakenly focuses on "the subjective states
of mind of public actors").
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that appears to be innocuous. Thus, I agree with Laurence Tribe, who
counsels:
[I] f a government-enacted rule of conduct is constitutionally inoffensive
both on its face and as applied to the particular individual challenging it,
the fact that the rule would not have been promulgated... but for the
enacting body's desire to achieve a constitutionally forbidden result tells
us nothing more than that the government264body engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to violate the Constitution.
But when a law that does single out protected conduct appears to
have as a primary purpose the frustration of the exercise of a right,
strict scrutiny is appropriate to determine whether there is a sufficiently close fit between the law and the asserted compelling interest it
serves; if not, then it is a fair inference that the law's principal pur26 s
pose is the illegitimate one of frustrating the exercise of a right.
Although the Casey joint opinion was wrong to suggest that even
purposeful barriers to the exercise of a constitutional right must be
substantial in order to be invalid, the suggestion may still have value
if we assume that by purposeful restrictions the joint opinion really
meant only targeted regulations. A targeted regulation applies only to
exercises of a right (such as abortion), but is not necessarily designed
for the purpose of frustrating its exercise. As Justice Powell pointed
out in his Zablocki v. Redhai 266 concurrence, most regulations of marriage will be targeted but nonpurposeful. 267 A few hypothetical examples will further illustrate the sense in which I mean the distinction
between targeted regulations and purposeful restrictions.
Suppose that there is a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. 268 Consider the three following regulations. First, every person
must seek the advice of at least two physicians before undertaking any
nonreversible course of medical treatment (Regulation A). This regulation imposes an incidental burden on the assumed right to physicianassisted suicide. My synthesis of existing doctrine requires that some
264 Tribe, supra note 27, at 23.
26S Cf City of Richmond v. J.A.

Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, 3., for a
plurality) (observing that the goal of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illicit governmental purposes
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
266 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
267 See id. at 397-99 (Powell, 3., concurring).
268 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, No. 94-35534, I996 WL 94848, at *i (gth Cir.
Mar. 6, r996) (en banc) (invalidating a state law prohibiting assisted suicide as applied to doctors

seeking to aid competent, terminally ill adult patients); ef. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (i99o) (assuming arguendo the right of a competent patient to refuse
life-saving food and water). Note that Justice O'Connor, who provided a crucial vote in Cruzan,

would have held that a competent patient has a right to refuse medical treatment. See id. at
287-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, five Justices were prepared to recognize a limited substantive right to die. Those who think either that Cruzan cannot be stretched this far or that, if it
can be, it would be an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution, might wish to imagine for the
sake of this example that there is an explicit constitutional amendment protecting "the right to
physician-assisted suicide."
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form of heightened scrutiny be satisfied if, but only if, the burden is
substantial. The test used to determine substantiality should, as in the
context of free speech and statutory free exercise, include an assessment of the rightholder's alternative means of exercising the right and
should use a baseline that is neutral in more than the sense2 6 9 from

270
Employment Division v. Smith.

Second, every person wishing to have the assistance of a physician
in committing suicide must first consult with a licensed psychiatrist
who certifies that the person both is mentally competent and wishes
sincerely to commit suicide after carefully considering the ramifications and alternatives (Regulation B). 27 1 The burden on the right to

physician-assisted suicide imposed by this regulation is not incidental
in the usual sense. The law singles out protected conduct for special
regulation; it is thus targeted at the right. The apparent purpose of
the law, however, is not to frustrate the exercise of the right to physician-assisted suicide. Rather, Regulation B appears to facilitate the exercise of the right in the same way that the authors of the Casey joint
opinion believed that some provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act facilitated the abortion decision. 272 Regulation B, then,
aims at ensuring that the right to physician-assisted suicide is exercised responsibly, and it arguably addresses the autonomy concerns
27 3
that underlie the suicide right.
Third, every person wishing to have the assistance of a physician
in committing suicide must first forfeit all of his or her assets to the
state (Regulation C). This regulation in no way facilitates the individual's choice whether to commit physician-assisted suicide. The regulation not only targets the right, but also affirmatively punishes those
who exercise it. Note that in practice, Regulation C may impose a
quite insubstantial burden. A person who wishes to avoid disinheriting his or her heirs might circumvent Regulation C through an irrevocable inter vivos gift prior to the suicide. Thus, if the substantiality
threshold applied to purposeful restrictions of this sort, Regulation C
would escape heightened scrutiny (assuming that the expedient of such
269

See supra pp.

I2$-I8.

270 494 U.S. 872 (199o).

271 Persons with experience in mental health law may worry that mental health professionals
would virtually never be willing to make the appropriate findings due to fear of liability. Perhaps
a rule of immunity would alleviate such a concern.
272 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5o U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
273 Targeted, nonpurposeful regulations will not always facilitate the exercise of a right. For
example, consider: every person wishing to have the assistance of a physician in committing suicide must first write a will (Regulation B). This regulation protects the welfare of the surviving
family members of the person who commits suicide - an interest that does not reflect government hostility to the right. It is thus targeted but nonpurposeful. Regulation B' is not necessarily
facilitative, however, because it directly regulates neither the decision whether to exercise the right
nor the right itself.
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a gift is not itself a substantial obstacle). But as we have seen, the
Casey plurality's suggestion to this effect should not be taken seriously
because the deliberate frustration of a right does not qualify as a legit2 74
imate government purpose.
If we take Regulations A, B, and C as illustrative of incidental,
targeted, and purposeful burdens, respectively, it seems reasonably

clear how the law should and does treat the first and last categories.
Incidental burdens are subject to the substantiality threshold, whereas
purposeful burdens are not. What about the middle category targeted, nonpurposeful burdens?
Casey and Zablocki suggest that such burdens must cross the substantiality threshold for heightened scrutiny to apply in the privacy
context. Ward v. Rock Against Racism 275 suggests a similar result for

content-neutral regulations of speech. Moreover, my proposed explanation of this result - that constitutional rights come with a built-in
allowance for restrictions designed to serve some valid purpose other
than merely frustrating the exercise of the right - implies that
targeted, nonpurposeful burdens on any fundamental right must reach
276
the substantiality threshold in order to trigger heightened scrutiny.
There is one large and important category of rights, however, for
which this proposition should not hold. These are rights that contain
norms of neutrality at their core. The classic instance of a neutrality
norm is the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In
Washington v. Davis,277 the Supreme Court held that a person does
not state a claim of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 2 78 merely by alleging that a government policy has the
274 I do not claim that Regulation C is irrational. The penalty of disinheriting one's heirs is a

perfectly rational approach to deterring suicide. But if physician-assisted suicide is a fundamental
right, as I am assuming here, then the goal of deterring suicide - as opposed to the goal of
ensuring that decisions to commit suicide are fully informed - is not a legitimate one.
275 491 U.S. 781 (989).
276 Such a test will permit some minor, purposeful burdens to escape heightened scrutiny, because absent heightened scrutiny, it is often difficult to discern the purpose of a law. See City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (i989) (O'Connor, J.,for a plurality); Sanford
Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On "Due Process of Lawmaking" and the
Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1035, 1044-5o (1994) (sug-

gesting that under a legal process conception of strict scrutiny, courts serve the function of ensuring that the legislature has fairly and openly considered claims of right); cf Stanley Ingber, The
Demise of Dialogue: Commentary on Perry and Nagel, 55 ALB. L. REv. 583, 589 (1992) (noting
that when courts ignore incidental burdens, no government official weighs the rightholder's claim,
because the "very general applicability of the regulations involved suggests that the enacting institutions . . . may well not have considered . . . the significance of their actions as they affect

constitutional values").
277 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
278 Davis actually involved the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, because it was a suit against the District of Columbia. See id. at 239 (citing
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-5oo (1954) (invalidating, under the Fifth Amendment, racial

segregation in District of Columbia schools)).
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effect of burdening persons of one race more severely than persons of
another race.2 79 Instead, the plaintiff must show that the government
has purposefully discriminated on the basis of race.
If the right to equal protection were like other rights, one might
think that when the government uses race for some purpose other
than simply disadvantaging persons based on race, such a targeted but
nonpurposeful regulation would receive deferential scrutiny. But the
Supreme Court has not adopted this approach. The Court now
strictly scrutinizes any conscious, race-based distribution of burdens
and benefits. 280 Indeed, even those Justices who have been most sympathetic to government programs designed to benefit traditionally disadvantaged racial groups advocate intermediate scrutiny, 28 1 rather
than complete deference or the de facto deference of United States v.
2 2
O'Brien. S
As I note elsewhere, the Supreme Court "views the drawing of various nonneutral lines as a constitutional violation, irrespective of the
practical effect those lines have on the affected persons."2 83 In this
sense, equal protection acts as a structural provision of the Constitution, much like federalism or separation of powers. Although the interests of individuals provide the ultimate justification for the
requirement of equal protection, in any particular case it operates as a
bar to certain government actions whether or not those actions implicate the interests that gave rise to the equal protection principle in the
first place. 28 4
279 See id. at 248.
280 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097, 2112-13 (1995) (overruling the
application of intermediate scrutiny to federal race-based classification in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (I99o)).
281 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (978) (opinion of Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
('[B]ecause of the significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be misused, . . .it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is any conceivable
basis that might sustain such a classification."). In this context, consider Justice Stevens's view
that a congressional program granting Japanese-American veterans an extraordinary preference in
government employment would impose only an "incidental burden" on those denied the benefit.
Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2121 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The burden is incidental in the
sense that the purpose of the program is not to harm persons who do not qualify for the benefit.
If we focus on targeting, however, the burden is direct because the government policy, by its
terms, classifies based on race. For Justice Stevens and the other dissenters from the Court's
application of strict scrutiny to all governmental use of racial classifications, purposeful harming
of a racial group is necessary for strict scrutiny to apply. Note, however, that the dissenters
would judge nonpurposeful targeting based on race - for example, most affirmative action programs - by intermediate rather than deferential scrutiny. They would not refer to a substantiality threshold, even though they might consider the burden imposed to be incidental.
282 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
283 Doff, supra note i, at 26o; see also id. at 26o n.93 (stating that Shaw v. Reno, ix3 S. Ct.
2816 (1993), "provides dramatic confirmation of this view of equal protection').
284 Asking what injury the white voters have suffered in the recent race-based redistricting
cases illustrates the point particularly well. According to Justice Stevens, they "have not suffered
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If we understand equal protection as a structural provision of the
Constitution - as I am suggesting that the Court does - then we do
not need to explain the fact that targeted uses of race trigger heightened scrutiny even absent an illicit purpose or a substantial burden,
whereas targeted regulations of abortion (or speech or free exercise)
trigger heightened scrutiny only if they serve an illicit purpose or impose a substantial burden. There is no explaining to do because the
violation of a structural norm is a wrong in itself,28 5 whereas the violation of a substantive norm is not.
Explanation is necessary, however, for those situations in which
the mere targeting of a substantive right triggers heightened scrutiny
even absent an illicit purpose or a substantial burden. This pattern
occurs most prominently under existing doctrine when courts consider
content-based regulations of speech. The explanation now becomes
apparent: the right to free speech is both substantive and structural.
As has been widely recognized, the free speech right serves both instrumental and noninstrumental purposes. 2 6 As a noninstrumental
matter, freedom of expression may be seen as essential to personhood
and, thus, a substantive right of great value to individuals. Simultaneously, a regime of free speech instrumentally facilitates self-government. Content-based and viewpoint-based regulations of speech pose a
threat to this instrumental goal through their systemic effects. According to the canonical view, they distort the marketplace of ideas and,
for this reason, must be strictly scrutinized even if their effect on any
given individual is relatively minor. In short, content-based and viewpoint-based regulations of speech are structurally problematic and
should therefore be treated more like infringements of the equal proany legally cognizable injury." Miller v. Johnson, uS S. Ct. 2475, 2497 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's response - that race-based classifications always injure the persons classified, see Miller, 115 S. CL at 2482 - is merely another way of saying that a conventional
injury stemming from the use of race is not necessary to trigger strict scrutiny.
28s5 The equal protection guarantee differs from other structural norms in that it is only presumptive. A prima facie infringement of the right to equal protection may be justified if strict
scrutiny is satisfied. In contrast, a separation of powers violation is per se unconstitutional,
although of course, the determination whether there has been a separation of powers violation
will often involve a weighing of competing interests. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
685-96 (1988).
286 Alexander Meiklejohn developed the best-known account of free speech as a means toward
achieving self-government. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM passim (g6o);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT passim

(1948). More recently, Cass Sunstein has been the leading proponent of an instrumental view of
free speech. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH at xi-xx
(1993). Despite the emphasis on self-government, instrumentalists typically find a way to conclude
that the free speech principle extends beyond political speech. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Populism
and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, r963 (1995) (reviewing CASS
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). In contrast, noninstrumentalists typically ground the free speech right in a conception of individual autonomy. See,
e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 331-37 (1981).
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tection principle than like infringements of rights that do not contain
equality norms.
I should note that many rights contain equality norms and may be
viewed as structural as well as substantive. For example, even under
Smith, a law that targets religion is subject to constitutional strict
scrutiny.28 7 This principle not only prevents petty harassment of religious institutions, but also serves the important structural goal of
maintaining civil peace through a governmental stance of neutrality
toward religion. 28 Similarly, to the extent that restrictions on the
abortion right constitute sex discrimination - as suggested by a ma-

jority of the Court in Casey28 9 but not by other Supreme Court decisions 290 - all targeted regulations of abortion ought to be subject to
heightened scrutiny because they infringe the structural goal of equal
29 1
protection.
In sum, the law ought to - and to a large extent does - distinguish among purposeful, targeted, and incidental burdens on primary
conduct rights. Heightened scrutiny should apply to all purposeful restrictions of substantive rights, to all regulations targeted at rights that
contain norms of equal treatment (including free speech and free exercise), to other targeted regulations that substantially burden rights, and
to incidental restrictions that similarly place substantial burdens on
rights. This general framework has been largely implicit in the law.
Converting it into an explicit formulation, as I propose here, will enable courts to see more clearly the nature of the interests at stake in
cases involving fundamental rights.
B.

Incidental Burdens and Facial Challenges

Despite the importance of looking to the nature of the particular
right at stake in any given case, some additional features of the inci287 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226-27
(x993).
288 Of course, government neutrality is a broad goal of both religion clauses. As the Court
stated in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (197o), the "general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will

not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion."
Id. at 669.
289 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5o5 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.").
290 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759 (x993) (holding that
opposition to abortion does not constitute animus toward women for purposes of conspiracy liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988)); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (x974) (holding that
the exclusion of pregnancy from a state disability-benefits program does not constitute sex
discrimination).
291 The Supreme Court subjects gender classifications to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), although it sometimes blurs the distinction, see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (994) (applying "heightened
scrutiny" to gender-based distinctions).
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dental burden question merit general discussion. Among these issues is
the relation between the proper treatment of incidental burdens and
that of facial challenges. The incidental burden question is, in some
sense, the mirror image of the facial challenge question. In a paradigmatic facial challenge case, the government attempts to apply a constitutionally or otherwise generally infirm law to a person whose own
conduct is not protected. In contrast, in an incidental burden case, the
government attempts to apply a generally valid law in a way that infringes on a person's rights in the particular circumstances. We may
summarize the two situations as follows: facial challenge - unprotected conduct, generally invalid law; incidental burden - protected
conduct, generally valid law. What implications do the doctrines of
facial challenges and of incidental burdens have for one another? To
answer this question, let me begin with a brief summary of facial challenge doctrine.
The Supreme Court has sometimes stated that a person will prevail
in challenging a law on its face only if she can show that "no set of
circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid." 29 2 In
other words, if a law has any constitutional applications, it will be
deemed facially valid. An exception for the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine - which permits a person whose own speech rights
are not violated to object to a law's scope as a means of preventing a
chilling effect on the protected First Amendment activity of others 29 3
typically accompanies statements of the general rule.
As I argue elsewhere, however, the "no-set-of-circumstances" test
neither accurately reflects the bulk of the Supreme Court's actual decisions nor is sound as a matter of principle. 29 4 The test that I propose
recognizes that a law's facial validity is ordinarily a question of severability. If a rule of law would be valid as applied to some cases but
invalid as applied to others, then the government may apply it in the
former cases if, but only if, the invalid applications may be severed
from the valid ones, thus leaving only a valid law. 29 5 In the case of a
facial challenge to a state law, state principles of statutory construction
will govern severability, and likewise in the case of a facial challenge
to a federal law, federal principles of statutory construction will gov29 6
ern severability.
Moreover, the overbreadth exception is broader than commonly
recognized. The Supreme Court has applied the overbreadth doctrine
in most of its right-to-privacy cases. 297 The Court's approach is sensi292 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

293 See id.
294 See Dorf, supra note i, at 236, 238.

See id. at 249-5I.
296 See id. at 283-93.
29S

297 See id.

at 271-76.
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ble because the overbreadth doctrine prevents courts from presuming
and thereby
a law's unconstitutional applications to be severable dismissing a facial challenge - in First Amendment cases and in all
other cases in which a constitutional right may be susceptible to a
chilling effect.2 98 These latter cases typically involve the right of
2 99
privacy.
The intersection of facial challenge doctrine and incidental burden
doctrine creates an apparent problem. As we have seen, virtually
every law can, under some circumstances, pose an unconstitutional incidental burden on a First Amendment or privacy right. Given that
the overbreadth doctrine prohibits severing these unconstitutional applications from the law's constitutional ones, is every law facially unconstitutional because of the possibility of incidental burdens?
Overbreadth doctrine includes a provision that avoids such an absurd conclusion. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,30 0 the Supreme Court
stated that the rationale for the overbreadth doctrine "attenuates as
the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct - even if
expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal
laws."301 In other words, free speech overbreadth doctrine does not
typically apply to incidental burdens on speech arising out of speechneutral laws.30 2 As the Court established in Broadrick, overbreadth
doctrine only operates when a law has a great many unconstitutional
applications. 30 3 Generalizing, we can say that overbreadth doctrine for
any given right will not apply to incidental burdens on that right.
For a successful overbreadth claim, the Broadrick Court thus requires what it terms "substantial" overbreadth. 30 4 This requirement
should not be confused with the test that I have proposed throughout
this Article - that an incidental burden be substantial in order to
trigger heightened scrutiny. To trigger heightened scrutiny, an incidental burden must be substantial in the sense that it imposes a weighty
hardship on the rightholder. For overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a
law because it imposes incidental burdens, the number of cases in
298 See id. at 268-71.
299 See id. at 268-76.
3oD 413 U.S. 6oi (1973).
301 Id. at 615 .
302 The Court's characterization of the particular activity at issue in Broadrick as conduct

rather than speech is somewhat curious. The challenged provision of Oklahoma's Merit System
of Personnel Administration Act prohibited civil servants from engaging in various political activities that the state would have had no power to prohibit the general public from doing. See id. at
602-o6. Although the activities in which the petitioners had engaged - partisan political affairs,
including soliciting money - may not have been pure speech, they were certainly the kinds of
activities protected by the First Amendment. Thus, it may be somewhat inaccurate to characterize the burden posed by the law challenged in Broadrick as incidental.
303 See id. at 615.
304 See id.
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which the law imposes such burdens, represented as a fraction of the
cases in which the law applies, must be substantial. Because the substantiality condition from Broadrick will rarely, if ever, be true of a
generally valid law, we need not fear that the intersection of the incidental burden and facial challenge doctrines will result in the wholesale invalidation of legislation.
C.

The Substantiality Threshold

The analysis presented by this Article suggests a rough-and-ready
test for determining which burdens on rights automatically trigger
heightened scrutiny and which burdens must first reach the substantiality threshold before heightened scrutiny ought to apply. We are still
left with the difficult task of determining what constitutes a substantial burden. Throughout this Article, I have suggested that a focus on
alternative means and a generous application of neutrality concepts
should guide the substantiality inquiry. But these tools are not by
themselves sufficient, as a class of examples illustrates.
Suppose that Susan wishes either: to buy commercial airtime on a
local radio station to express her views with respect to an issue of
great importance to her; or to purchase an airline ticket to travel on a
pilgrimage to a distant holy site; or to pay for an abortion at a forprofit private hospital. Susan, however, is a struggling student who
lacks the funds to carry out any of these plans. She would like to use
her computer to transfer a sum of money from the account of a large
pension fund to her own bank account, and then use the money to
finance one of these activities. Unfortunately for Susan, this would
violate the criminal law prohibiting larceny. Must the state satisfy
some form of heightened scrutiny to apply its larceny law to any of
the three planned courses of conduct?
In quantitative terms, the burden that the larceny law imposes on
Susan's ability to exercise her rights is substantial. In the absence of
the larceny law, she could simply appropriate the large sum of money
which she needs. To be sure, the larceny law is in no way directed at
protected conduct, but that only means that the burden imposed must
be substantial for heightened scrutiny to apply. For Susan, it appears
that the burden is substantial.
Yet surely the state should not have to satisfy heightened scrutiny
in order to enforce its larceny law against someone who wishes to use
her ill-gotten gains to finance conduct that is protected against coercive governmental restriction. The question becomes whether we can
distinguish this example in a principled way. The question is of critical importance, because as legal realists and their modern-day intellectual successors correctly note, nearly all social relations are in some
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real sense the product of law in a complex society such as ours.305 A
person's ability to exercise her rights will be substantially affected and
may be substantially burdened by, among other things: how much of
her income the government takes in taxes; what services the government provides to facilitate a variety of activities, including but not
limited to protected activities; what laws govern property and the enforcement of contracts; and so forth.
A variety of principles are available to distinguish examples such
as these. Most important, perhaps, is the distinction between positive
and negative rights. A right to do x, it is often said, is not a right to a
government subsidy to do x. 30 6 Rather, a right to do x is merely a
right to avoid government interference with one's efforts to do x. This
response will not satisfy the legal realist, however, because it rests on
the very public/private distinction that the realist critiques. 30 7 If all
social relations are the product of law, then the government cannot
disclaim responsibility for events in the private sphere, because private
events too can be traced to government policy.
Of course, the public/private distinction, even if theoretically problematic in the way that legal realists clairh, is firmly rooted in constitutional jurisprudence. 30 8 Thus, pointing out that an argument rests
on this distinction hardly discredits the argument. Moreover, a court
can justify the distinction between positive and negative rights by
principles of separation of powers (and, in the case of state law, federalism) regardless of what one thinks of the distinction as a matter of
rights theory. Representative bodies control the power of the purse,
and thus, courts will order the expenditure of money in only the most
unusual of cases, 30 9
How potent is the positive/negative distinction? In the examples
given above, Susan arguably does not claim a right to a government
subsidy to exercise her rights. Rather, she claims an exemption from a
generally applicable law governing conduct by private parties. Invok30S For the modem version of this argument as it applies to free speech see SUNSTEIN, cited
above in note 286, at 17-51, in which he argues for "A New Deal For Speech" that recognizes
threats to free speech from background laws. But see Alexander, supra note 9s, at 930-3I (arguing that Sunstein's analysis fails because all background laws threaten someone's speech).
306 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 5oo U.S. 173, 196-2oo (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
316-17 (ig8o); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (x977). But see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342-46 (1963) (holding that an indigent criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment
right to a government-subsidized attorney).
307 See Balkin, supra note 286, at I968 (noting that the legal realist critique of the public/
private distinction "softens the distinctions between positive and negative liberties').
308 Cf. TRIE & DoRa, supra note 55, at 70-71 (noting that the Takings Clause, by its terms, is
inconsistent with the legal realist view of property).
309 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-51 (199o) (holding that, as a matter of comity, a
federal district court could not order a local property tax increase as a remedy for unconstitutional racial segregation in education without first assuring itself that no less drastic alternative
existed).
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ing the positive/negative distinction in this context recasts the inter310
twined/facilitative distinction discussed in the free speech section.
electronically
Even from Susan's perspective, the burdened act stealing money - is at most facilitative of, rather than intertwined
with, the protected conduct. Under one reading of Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc. ,3 therefore, we might say that no matter how substantial
a burden the larceny prohibition poses, it is not a burden on protected
conduct. 31 2 Susan's lack of money impedes her ability to exercise her
rights, and the larceny prohibition is only coincidentally connected to
her rights.
Recall from our free speech discussion, however, that the distinction between facilitative and intertwined acts will often be difficult to
maintain and, in any event, cannot dispose of all the substantial burdens that we might intuitively wish to exempt from heightened scrutiny.31 3 Thus, even allowing for a distinction between positive and
negative rights and even discounting burdens on merely facilitative
conduct, some incidental burdens will still trigger heightened scrutiny.
This should not be cause for great alarm. In most of the troubling
cases, the government will easily meet its justificatory burden. For example, we need not worry that subjecting the law that prohibits murder to heightened scrutiny in the case of ritual human sacrifice will
insulate that practice from punishment.
Sometimes, of course, the government will not be able to justify
what appears to be a substantial incidental burden on a right, but this
failure does not necessarily undermine the approach that I have outlined. We should expect that taking incidental burdens seriously will
sometimes, perhaps even often, impose additional requirements on
government.
Consider the following hypothetical case: Dorothy's religion obligates her to take a hot air balloon pilgrimage from her home in Kansas to the holy land of Oz during a particular holy week at some point
prior to her twenty-first birthday. Dorothy, now twenty years old, has
been saving money since she was a child to be able to afford her ticket
to Oz. The day before Dorothy's scheduled Kansas-to-Oz flight during
the holy week, the relevant Kansas authorities announce that there
will be no hot air balloon flights for the next week in order that they
can conduct spot checks of the safety equipment of all hot air balloons
in the state. Does RFRA prevent Kansas from grounding Dorothy's
balloon during the crucial week?
In response to questions such as this one, I find myself tempted
immediately to try to find ways of deeming RFRA inapplicable. Is
310
311
312
313

See
478
See
See

supra pp. 206-o.
U.S. 697 (1986).
supra pp. 1205-o6.
supra pp. 12o6-o8.
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Dorothy seeking affirmative aid from the government? Apparently
not, because she has purchased a ticket from a private balloonist. Perhaps the regulated act is merely facilitative. This objection also fails,
because Dorothy has an obligation not merely to arrive in Oz, but to
travel there by hot air balloon from Kansas during this particular
week - the very act prohibited by the state. Thus, under RFRA the
restriction must satisfy strict scrutiny.
Even upon this conclusion, I find that I try to assure myself that
the law will be upheld. Surely ensuring air balloon safety is a compelling interest. It may well be, but it will hardly be true that the state's
policy is the least restrictive means of advancing its interest. The state
could inspect the safety equipment of the balloon that Dorothy intends
to fly before inspecting the equipment of other balloons. This special
treatment will certainly be administratively awkward for the regulatory agency, which would like to schedule inspections at its convenience, but the inefficiency seems minor. Dorothy goes to Oz.
I doubt that I am alone in my tendency to deem most incidental
burdens permissible. Judges with real docket pressure are at least as
concerned with the floodgates problem as academics are. Dorothy's
case, whimsical as it may be, should thus serve as a warning. Even
when a law has the effect of rendering impossible the performance of
a required religious act, we feel a strong pull toward sustaining government power. Without minimizing the risk of over-enforcement of
rights against incidental burdens, the real danger probably lies in the
other direction. Recall that in Smith itself, even Justice O'Connor,
who disagreed with the majority's approach, would have held that the
peyote prohibition survived strict scrutiny 314 - despite the state's failure to show that sacramental peyote use seriously harmed third parties
or even the users themselves.
D. Nonprimary Conduct Rights
Although a comprehensive treatment of all incidental effects in
constitutional law is beyond the scope of this Article, the analysis of
incidental burdens on primary conduct rights suggests a number of
strategic starting points for evaluating burdens on other kinds of constitutional rights. In this concluding section, I consider two related
factors which seem especially important: the reasons for recognizing a
right and the scope of the interests protected.
How can analysis of the reasons for recognizing a right be useful in
assessing burdens on nonprimary conduct rights? Consider this question in the context of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In Colorado v. Connelly,3 15 the Supreme Court judged the
314

See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894-96, 9o3 (x9go) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
315 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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admissibility of a murder confession by a defendant suffering from a
psychosis that caused him to hear what he perceived as commands
from God. 3 16 The defendant argued that his confession was inadmissi-

ble under the Fifth Amendment's requirement that "[n]o person shall
• . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."3 17 Relying on Supreme Court decisions holding voluntariness to
be the sine qua non of admissibility under the Fifth Amendment, the
defendant argued that his case fell within the prohibition's literal text,
because the voices in his head compelled him to be a witness against
himself.3 18 The Court rejected the claim because of its view concerning the purpose of the prohibition against coerced confessions.
According to the Connelly Court, the "integral element" of an unconstitutional, coerced confession is "police overreaching."3 1 9 Viewed
in this fashion, individuals do not have a protected interest in freedom
from coercion as such. Instead, the Fifth Amendment grants a right
against compelled testimony as a means of restraining the police. In
contrast, if the right against compelled testimony is valuable in itself
in the same way that primary conduct rights are, then that right
would protect against incidental burdens - presumably including the
incidental burden that arises out of a police officer's mere presence in
the vicinity of someone suffering a psychosis like Connelly's. Because
the Court perceived the prohibition on compelled testimony as a restraint on the police, 320 however, it defined the right as a right against
testimony compelled by the police. The Court's understanding of the
reasons for recognizing the right leads to a definition of the right that
excludes the possibility of incidental infringement.
As we saw in section ll.C, some primary conduct rights serve as
both restrictions on government power and affirmative entitlements of
the individual. 32' Nonprimary conduct rights may have this feature as
well. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures is one example. Its first clause proclaims: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
322 The reasonableness requirement suggests a direct concern

. ...

with police conduct, whereas the text also appears to protect individual interests in privacy (in the sense of secrecy and security rather
than in the sense described in section ll.C above). Focusing on one
316

See id. at

i59.

317 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.

318 See Connelly, 479 U.S. at x64 (discussing defendant's reliance upon Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. r99 (1g6o), and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (x963)).
319 Id.
320 The Court also recognized that coerced confessions are often unreliable but stated that this
issue is a subconstitutional question of state evidence law. See id. at 167.
321 See supra p. 1227.
322 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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goal or the other may lead to different results. For instance, suppose
that a police officer acting in good faith reasonably believes that she
has probable cause to search a suspect's home and that exigent circumstances preclude obtaining a warrant prior to a search. If a court
officer's
later determines that probable cause did not exist, should the
323
conduct be understood to violate the Fourth Amendment?
A court would, no doubt, wish to consider a number of factors
peculiar to the particular context. If the issue arises in the course of a
suppression motion prior to a criminal trial, the court will want to
balance the deterrent effects of exclusion of arguably illegally seized
evidence against the social costs of freeing a potentially guilty person.
But certainly one factor relevant to the analysis is the degree to which
we believe that the Fourth Amendment serves to protect interests of
value to individuals. A court that considers individual privacy a key
concern of the Fourth Amendment will be more likely to find that the
officer's good faith is irrelevant, because even absent deliberate police
overreaching, the invasion of privacy constitutes a substantial harm.
The incidental effects will matter to such a court.
That some right protects interests of value to the rightholder is not,
however, a sufficient condition for applying heightened scrutiny to
substantial incidental burdens on the exercise of that right. Consider
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, which commands that "private property" shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation."3 24 The Takings Clause protects an interest of value to
individuals - the right to own private property. Yet the Supreme
Court has never suggested that laws having the incidental effect of
substantially devaluing private property require just compensation,
and for good reason. Every regulation has the potential to effect the
value of property, often substantially. For example, laws siting locally
undesirable government functions, such as sewage treatment or drug
rehabilitation, may cause property values to decline substantially. The
discontinuation of appropriations for a military base may severely undermine the surrounding local economy and property values. Laws
redrawing school district lines to achieve racial desegregation may lead
to flight and property devaluation.
Consequently, although the Supreme Court has recently looked favorably on takings claims, 325 it has not come close to employing the
323 Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized pursuant to a facially invalid
warrant when an officer in good faith reasonably believed that the warrant stated facts sufficient

to constitute probable cause) with Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (978) (holding that
bad faith does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation where objective facts known to an
officer supported a wiretap).
324 U.S. CONs'. amend. V.
32S See Dolan v. City of TMgard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2322 (994) (finding a taking when a city
required a hardware store owner to dedicate land to a public walkway and bicycle path in ex-
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substantial burden framework that RFRA requires for incidental burdens on religion. Even for direct regulations of property use, so long
as the regulation is "related both in nature and extent" to the property
owner's actions, 326 the Court requires the destruction of "economically
viable use" of the regulated property before ordering just compensation.3 27 Even then, the Court will not require compensation if the regulation merely prohibits a use that constitutes a violation of the

328
background principles of nuisance or property law.

The Court's refusal to treat incidental burdens on property as takings can be justified on more than a floodgates rationale. Property
rights differ from the primary conduct rights discussed in Part II in a
crucial respect. For a primary conduct right, we can describe what it
means to exercise the right without any reference to the state. The
conduct of giving a speech, of ritually ingesting peyote, or of having
an abortion is a perfectly coherent concept. As the legal realists argued, however, the concept of property ordinarily refers to the state's
willingness to assist the propertyholder in defeating the claims of
others.3 2 9 The point is not that property rights consist of whatever
rights the state chooses to recognize. The same positivist claim could
be made about primary conduct rights. Rather, the realists showed
that a web of government regulation creates the concept of property
itself. Hence, any significant alteration in the web not only could, but
typically will, burden property rights.
Finally, consider the nonprimary conduct right to equal protection
of the laws. In section IH.A, I argued that the Supreme Court understands this right to serve a structural function and thus subjects
targeted, nonpurposeful burdens to heightened scrutiny without regard
to whether these burdens are substantial. 33 0 How should truly incidental burdens on the equal protection right be treated?
We may think of laws that have a disparate impact on racial (or
other suspect) minorities as incidentally burdening the right to equal
protection. Existing doctrine does not require heightened scrutiny of

change for a permit to expand her store and pave her parking lot); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987) (finding a taking when a commission required an easement
along beachfront property as a condition for a building permit).
326 Dolan, 114 S. CL at 2320.
327 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, io6 (1992) (quoting Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 26o (x98o)) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis omitted).
328 See id. at 1029-30.
329 See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927). See
generally C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134
U. PA. L. REV. 74r , 741-42 (r986) (disaggregating property into the multiple purposes that it

serves and arguing that, by itself, the concept of property deserves less constitutional protection
than most constitutionally protected liberty).
330 See supra pp. 1237-39.

1250

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1og:175

such laws. 33 ' This seems sensible. As a principle designed to restrain

the government from acting based upon racial or other suspect criteria, equal protection is not offended when the government does not
predicate its decisionmaking on such criteria, even though the action
taken has the incidental effect of disproportionately burdening a racial
minority.
Further examination of current doctrine reveals a puzzle, however.
The Court repeatedly affirms the principle that equal protection rights
are "personal."3 3 2 As I have argued throughout this Article, laws infringing personal rights harm the rightholder regardless whether they
are directed at those rights.
The solution to the puzzle can be found in the peculiar nature of
the "personal" right to equal protection. According to the Supreme
Court, it is a personal right not to be burdened or denied a benefit on
the basis of a suspect classification. The Court may recognize the
right to be personal, but its scope is apparently defined in relation to
government action. Equal protection does not protect an interest of an
individual that exists independently of the government's conduct with
respect to that person. We would not expect a right so defined to receive protection against incidental burdens, because by definition, incidental effects do not burden the right.
Equal protection law as it stands is therefore consistent with the
framework proposed in this Article. However, consistency with the
conceptual framework is no guarantee of correctness. The framework
set forth here tells us how the law should deal with various kinds of
infringements of given rights, but it does not tell us how to give substantive content to those rights.
For example, suppose that the Court were to rule that equal protection does not entail the structural principle of race-neutrality;
rather, it champions the principle that government may not perpetuate
racial subordination. This second principle would also be structural,
in the sense that it focuses on the limits of government power instead
of the interests of individuals. Yet under the anti-subordination principle, it would be entirely appropriate to apply strict scrutiny to government programs having a disparate impact on racial minorities. Seen
through the lens of our alternative equal protection principle, the disparate impact would no longer be an incidental effect. If the disparate impact were sufficiently severe as measured by the appropriate
substantive test, it would contribute to racial subordination and, thus,

331 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977) ("[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact." (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976))).
332 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (x995) (noting "the long
line of cases understanding equal protection as a personal right").
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directly infringe the alternative equal protection principle prohibiting
the perpetuation of racial subordination.
The incidental burden framework itself cannot choose between a
regime of race-neutrality and a regime of anti-subordination any more
than it can tell us whether the Due Process Clause encompasses a
right to abortion or whether the First Amendment encompasses a right
to burn a flag. These decisions require substantive interpretation of
the relevant constitutional rights. The framework described in this
Article is useful -

and only useful -

in delineating the scope and

nature of the protection that rights should receive once they are recognized and defined.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Conventional sources of constitutional meaning all point toward
treating incidental burdens as infringements on fundamental constitutional rights to engage in primary conduct. Yet to treat every incidental burden as calling for heightened scrutiny would render effective
government regulation impossible in a wide range of situations. As a
result, the Supreme Court has developed limiting principles, albeit
haltingly and sometimes unwittingly. The sensible limiting principle
toward which both Congress and the Court have been moving is a
substantiality threshold. Under this approach, laws that are designed
to frustrate or that substantially burden the exercise of a right must be
subject to heightened scrutiny. The limiting principle is itself subject
to an important reservation, however: it does not fully apply to rights
to equal treatment.
This summary is an amalgam of existing doctrine and proposed
improvements. Although it provides a useful starting point for analyzing claims that the government has infringed a fundamental right, it is
only a starting point. In any real case, sorting out the differences between purposeful, targeted, and incidental burdens will clarify but will
not answer the difficult questions about the scope of an asserted right
and the government's power to override it.

